

# POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN CASAMANCE, SENEGAL



**iDMC** internal  
displacement  
monitoring  
centre

**NRC** NORWEGIAN  
REFUGEE COUNCIL



SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

**GLOBAL PROGRAM ON FORCED DISPLACEMENT**

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### List of Abbreviations

ARD	Agence Régionale de Développement
CNAMS	Centre National d'Action Antimines du Sénégal
CR	Communauté Rurale
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
FD	Forced Displacement
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GPCWG	Global Protection Cluster Working Group
GPFD	Global Program on Forced Displacement
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	International Development Association
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IRR Model	Impoverishment, Risk and Reconstruction Model
MFDC	Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PRA	Participatory Rural Approach
SPF	State and Peace-Building Fund
UNHCR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
USOFORAL	Comité Régional de Solidarité des Femmes pour la Paix en Casamance, (« unissons-nous » in Diola)
WFP	World Food Programme

### Definition of Key Terms

- **Casamançais** is the local term used for people living in/originating from the Casamance. **Casaçais** is the colloquial equivalent. **Casamance**, Casamance Region, nowadays often called *Casamance naturelle* [natural Casamance] is a geographical and historical space delineated by Gambia in the north, the Atlantic in the west, Guinea-Bissau in the South, and the Gouloumbou River in the east. As an administrative unit it has been replaced by the regions Kolda, Sedhiou and Ziguinchor, named after the capital of each region. **Balantakunda**, **Bandial**, **Bliss**, **Buluf**, **Fogny**, **Karon**, **Kasa** are local ethno-linguistic differentiations that mostly coincide with the local distinctions between ethnic groups. These so-called *regions traditionnelles* [traditional regions] are featuring similar sociocultural settings. **Diola** is an ethnic group found in Senegal, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Diola is the French and most common, Jola is the English and Joola is the official national spelling. The label nowadays is used for a variety of different languages, all belonging to the Atlantic languages a branch of the Niger-Congo group. The use of the term Diola here is confined to the present as historically different terms were used (cf. Mark 1985). **IDP (Internally Displaced Person)** persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.<sup>1</sup> **Maquis** (French for “the bush”) refers to the guerrilla fighters of the MFDC. The Diola equivalent is *Attika*, a term that is used to circumscribe the armed branch of the MFDC. **MFDC** (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance), is a former political party that re-emerged as a guerrilla movement at the beginning of the 1980s. The movement fights for an independent Casamance. **Refugee**, individual that “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”<sup>2</sup> **Violence** is the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, misdevelopment or deprivation.<sup>3</sup>

1 IDMC, 2013, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, Introduction, para. 2.

2 UN, 1951, *Refugee Convention*, New York.

3 Krug, A. & et.al., T., 2002. *World Report on Violence and Health*, Geneva, quotation, p. 5.

### **Terminology**

Local terms are used according to the national Senegalese spelling. Diola is one of the official languages in Senegal. The spelling in Senegal is nevertheless far from uniform. Even on official signposts the spelling of villages differs. Diola vowels are not pronounced like in French, but like in the phonetic alphabet.

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## Executive Summary

The separatist *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC) has been fighting for an independent Casamance since 1982. While the fight started with popular protests, it quickly assumed the tone of a guerrilla war in the 1990s. Several ceasefires and peace accords were negotiated since, albeit with almost no impact on the prospects for durable peace. A peace agreement was signed in 2004 but has been implemented with limited success. At the heart of the conflict lie a disputed land rights reform, discriminatory administrative practices, partially incompatible socio-political structures, and a lack of employment opportunities. Since mid-2012, however, there have been new openings for peace in Casamance thanks to a change in government in Dakar - which has made the resolution of the conflict as one of its top priorities - willingness from the MFDC to enter peace talks and a growing popular movement pushing for negotiations between the Senegalese government and the MFDC.

Forced displacement in Casamance is not only the direct result of the armed conflict but it has also been instrumental to the different parties to the conflict throughout the years in controlling natural resources in the region. A low-level war economy based on illegal logging, cashew nuts, illegal cannabis growing, and smuggling has been benefiting both sides to the conflict and “undermined any sense of urgency to end the conflict”. A market of peace on the contrary nurtures the conflict because it ensures considerable benefits for all parties to the conflict and involved mediators. Forced displacement in Casamance has also to be contextualized within transnational issues. Historical ties as well as regional politics have been playing a role in shaping patterns of displacement, which transcend borders. They assume a sub-regional aspect with forced displacement becoming inter-linked with economic migration patterns.

A review of the data available on the number and patterns of displacement is the basis to understand the impact of forced displacement on society and the degree of impoverishment risks and to develop targeted programmes. Following Cernea’s Impoverishment, Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) Model, our research has found that the aspects that are key to supporting the achievement of durable solutions by displaced groups in Casamance are closely linked to access to land, employment, education opportunities in the short run, and economical and political decentralization in the long run. Understanding the obstacles faced by displaced groups in accessing such resources in the short run is essential. It is also necessary to analyze the way forced displacement is instrumentalised by international, national and local stakeholders. The Senegalese army, for example, reportedly plundered the resources (houses, crops) of displaced villagers to prevent rebels from using them. Rebel forces routinely displaced civilians in an effort to control territory. Options for return have faced similar constraints.

Our research has confirmed that historical policies, inequality, marginalization, weak governance, and entrenched poverty have conspired to foster continued impoverishment and

arrested development in displacement-affected communities. It is at the same time important to deepen knowledge around displaced populations' decision making and the social and economic opportunity structures in areas of both displacement and return. A comprehensive survey, measuring and examining the key factors in determining behaviour vis-à-vis durable solutions also in areas close to the border with the Gambia would be highly beneficial to inform future policies. A detailed census of displacement, specific research into land ownership and user rights – including displaced groups – and a mapping of land disputes would be extremely useful in determining the operational scope and availability of current dispute resolution mechanisms. Labor market research in Ziguinchor would help identify specific opportunities in the city and help redirect efforts at vocational training in the right direction.

The following concrete actions would support the achievement of durable solutions for displaced groups: a) Support of information and legal aid centres. The role of legal aid centres could be strengthened by training their staff on the specific situation and rights of IDPs and returning refugees. Displaced groups should be assisted by the centres specifically to obtain legal information, and to access land by supporting the resolution of land disputes. b) Support formal and vocational training opportunities. For longer-term refugees a review mechanism could be designed for the recognition of qualifications gained abroad. For short-term displaced groups, *classes passerelles* with curricula following the Senegalese standards could be devised to allow children to reintegrate their schools of origin more easily and to appease parents' fears to some extent.

Rebuilding social capital as well as supporting local ownership should be overarching principles informing all approaches to forced displacement in Casamance. Any development project in the Casamance will, however, remain futile if the conflict, its causes and consequences are not explicitly addressed. An integrated approach is necessary to resolve the Casamance conflict after three lost decades of this low intensity war.

## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1. Motivation of the project**

The request for a political economy analysis of forced displacement in Casamance was born out of a need to develop an informed development-oriented approach to Casamance forced displacement, which Bank country teams can rely on when discussing with Governments and other stakeholders. This analytical report takes into account the opportunities to feed such an analysis into the forthcoming IDA multi-sector project in Casamance.

The World Bank's engagement on forced displacement, in the three countries – Senegal, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau – has been limited and indirect. It is, however, increasingly recognized that forced displacement caused by the Casamance conflict poses serious development challenges, in addition to humanitarian, political, and security concerns.<sup>4</sup> The forthcoming IDA and SPF projects will therefore address the issues of forced displacement in the sub-region. These projects require a coherent strategy that is based on a detailed understanding of the political economy of the conflict.

### **1.2. Research objectives and specifications**

In line with the Terms of Reference of the study, the objective of the research is threefold, to:

- (i) assess Casamance forced displacement in Senegal, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau from a development and political economy perspective;
- (ii) develop a framework of understanding of the associated issues, challenges, and opportunities that will support Bank country teams in their policy dialogue with their counterparts and partners; and
- (iii) provide recommendations on how new and current Bank operations could address the development challenge of Casamance forced displacement.

To meet the objective of the research, the study investigated livelihood strategies, assessed vulnerabilities of displaced households and analysed the barriers to and the conditions necessary for the achievement of durable solutions with a view to informing a development-oriented approach to Casamance forced displacement. The report situates displacement issues within a broader political analysis and as such touches upon the following questions: a) How are power and resources distributed between different social groups? b) What kind of grievances or tensions exist between these groups, and how have they been managed? c) What kinds of challenges or obstacles exist and what kinds of opportunities for finding durable solutions?<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Ferris, E. & Stark, C., 2012. *Internal Displacement in West Africa: A snapshot*. Washington: NRC/IDMC, 2010. *New displacement and challenges to durable solutions in Casamance*. Geneva: Christensen, A. & Harild, N., 2009. *Forced Displacement: the Development Challenge*. Washington.

<sup>5</sup> These lead questions were split up into the key questions (cf. appendix) that framed the fieldwork carried out in cooperation with the University of Ziguinchor in January 2012.



### 1.3. Approach and methodology

In order to narrow down the focus of the study, we adopted the Impoverishment, Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) Model, developed by Michael Cernea (2000), as the assessment's analytical framework. Cernea has developed a theoretical model that delineates the risks that come with displacement (the causes of impoverishment) and what can be done to address them and reconstitute livelihoods. These factors influence one another both in terms of impoverishment outcomes and desired actions<sup>6</sup>. Cernea's approach helps to deconstruct the multi-faceted displacement experience into identifiable components. As the model suggests, preventing or overcoming impoverishment patterns requires risk reversal strategies for which the implications of how power and resources are shared, managed and contested are an important element to understand.

In their study "Internal Displacement in Africa: A Challenge for Development Actors", Kalin and Schrepfer (2012)<sup>7</sup> highlight how the IRR model can be easily adapted by development actors as a tool to understand the challenges faced in displacement. Particularly useful in this regard is the fact that the model stresses an action-oriented analysis. The IRR model suggests that preventing or overcoming the pattern of impoverishment requires targeted risk reversal or mitigation.<sup>8</sup>

This study follows Kalin and Schrepfer's adaptation of the list of risks leading to impoverishment and the processes needed to reverse or mitigate them. These are helpful in stressing the conditions necessary for creating the basis for IDPs to achieve durable solutions and an end to their displacement. The list of processes is reformulated as follows by Kalin and Schrepfer:

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6 Cernea, Michael M. 2000. 'Risks, Safeguards and Reconstruction: A Model for Population Displacement and Resettlement'. *Economic and Political Weekly* 35 (41) (October 7): 3659–3678.

7 Schrepfer, Nina, and Walter Kälin. 2012. *Report on Internal Displacement in Africa A Development Challenge*. Geneva: IDMC.

8 Cernea, Michael M. 2004. 'Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, and Reconstruction: A Model of Population Displacement and Resettlement'. In *UN Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Development, Beijing (27–29 October)*, p.10.

- a. From **landlessness** to access to / restitution of land after and, if possible, temporary use of land during displacement;
- b. From **joblessness** to reemployment after and, if possible, temporary employment during displacement;
- c. From **homelessness** to temporary shelter during and permanent housing after displacement;
- d. From **marginalization** to social inclusion both during and after displacement;
- e. From **food insecurity** to adequate food and nutrition during and after displacement;
- f. From **increased morbidity** to improved health care during and after displacement;
- g. From **loss of common property** to restoration of community assets and services;
- h. From **social disarticulation** to rebuilding of networks and community during and after displacement, including through reconciliation;
- i. From **loss of educational opportunities** to restoration of access to education.

This perspective on above-mentioned processes helps to identify: a) the existing problems and local reactive arrangements and tactics; and b) actions and strategies needed to be implemented to address the impact of forced displacement on the development of the region.<sup>9</sup> Given the specificities of forced displacement in Casamance (see below), we combined the analysis of the risks related to landlessness, joblessness and homelessness into one where appropriate.

#### **1.4. Sites and activities**

The methodology for the study consisted of qualitative research tools. Data was drawn from both primary and secondary sources. An initial literature review of documentation (Montemurro, Inception Report: Annex, 2012) showed that due to complex patterns of internal and cross-border population movements over time, there have been few reliable statistics on forced displacement associated with the Casamance conflict. Though an exhaustive profiling of the situation of internal displacement in Casamance (to identify the number and location of IDPs) would have been highly beneficial, it went beyond the scope of the present study.

Primary data was collected through a participatory assessment with displaced populations and host communities in Casamance, Senegal in December 2012 and January 2013. Relevant authorities and other stakeholders in Casamance, neighbouring Guinea Bissau and The Gambia, including national/local and international NGOs, multilateral and bilateral organizations were consulted (cf. Compilation of Notes 2013). Due attention was paid to ensure that participatory assessment did not expose interviewees (displaced and non-displaced groups) to any risks resulting from sharing personal and sensitive information. The study paid special attention to those displaced in urban areas, those displaced in rural areas and returning

<sup>9</sup> The questionnaire used in the fieldwork is found in the CdN. Key research questions are annexed.

IDPs/refugees or displaced groups progressing towards the achievement of other durable solutions.

These groups were approached in villages in the border areas that feature high degrees of insecurity, significant numbers of IDPs and returnees (Northern region: Silick, Sindian, Gran Coulaye; Southern region: Djibanar). Nearly or partially abandoned villages (North: Katanpor; South: Youtou), and re-settled villages (Etafon) were included, too. Apart from those rural communities, research was conducted in one urban area (Ziguinchor). Inquiries were carried out with local students in order to build/ strengthen local capacities. More details about the choice of sites, the details of the approach, and a description of methodology – including full interviews, group discussions and observations – can be found in the *Compilation de Notes (CdN)*<sup>10</sup> accompanying this report.

## 2. Background and Context

Protracted conflict, characterized by lack of development, relative deprivation, perceived injustices, and forms of exclusion between groups, can hinder the achievement of durable solutions for displaced populations.<sup>11</sup> Displaced populations, in turn, are at greater risk of impoverishment and marginalization. This has a bearing on the human and social capital, economic growth, poverty reduction efforts, and environmental stability of the society at large.<sup>12</sup>



### 2.1. Historical background and causes of displacement

Forced displacement (both internally and to neighbouring countries) in Senegal's Casamance region has been caused by one of Africa's longest running civil conflicts. Casamance is the southern part of Senegal sitting between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. It is an area of approximately 30,000 square kilometres with a population of 1.7 million. Despite its protracted nature, Casamance's conflict remains little known. The conflict developed from a rebellion instigated in 1982 by the separatist *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC) into a full-scale armed conflict against the Senegalese army in the 1990s.

As the conflict spread from the Ziguinchor areas into western parts of Kolda region from the early 1990s, it also quickly became regionalised. Thousands of people fled into neighbouring

10 Rudolf, Markus, and et.al., 2010, *Analyse Economique Du Deplacement Force a La Casamance, Senegal*. Geneva: World Bank, Draft Report.

11 Protracted displacement situations are to be intended as "situations in which the process for finding durable solutions is stalled and/or displaced populations are marginalized as a consequence of a lack of protection of their human rights". Participants at the 2007 Expert Seminar on Protracted IDP Situations hosted by UNHCR and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement agreed on this definition.

12 Harild, Niels, and Asger Christensen. 2010. 'The Development Challenge of Finding Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced People'. *World Bank Development Report 2011, Background Note [July 2010]*.

The Gambia and Guinea Bissau. Access to land became more difficult as rebels began planting anti-personnel mines along the border with Guinea-Bissau in 1997 to protect their bases. A peace agreement was signed in 2004 but has been implemented with limited success so far. Despite its low intensity, the Casamance conflict has resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries, large-scale displacement and a dramatic deterioration in economic, social, and human indicators. Resurgence of violence has been acute since mid-2009.

Several causes lie at the heart of the conflict: (i) a disputed land rights reform, (ii) cultural discrimination, and (iii) a lack of employment opportunities for educated individuals. The experience of being side-lined by Dakar was accentuated furthermore by immigration from the North and the monopoly of Northern business and enterprises in the Casamance. The conflict constituting factors were amplified by the factual dispossession of territory by the administration,<sup>13</sup> the administrative bias favouring political elites from the north,<sup>14</sup> and the process of Wolofisation<sup>15</sup> [increasing domination of Wolof in language and religion]. The locally dominant acephalous social structure made it difficult to mediate amongst the interests of the government in Dakar and the population in the Casamance.<sup>16</sup>

## 2.2. Recent developments

Until 2000, national peace initiatives had repeatedly failed to restore peace. When elected in 2000, President Wade promised to end the conflict in 100 days. A peace agreement was signed four years later and from then on the Senegalese government equalled rebels to criminal groups affecting their negotiating powers. The lack of an effective demobilisation, disarming, or reintegration (DDR) process compounded by a fragmentation of the MFDC (political and military wings), led to the failure of the peace process.

Violence resumed after 2009, as a new MFDC splinter group of hardliners emerged.<sup>17</sup> Additional heavy weapons entered the region. Nightly street curfews were imposed (e.g. on the important Diouloulou-Bignona corridor in 2009). Army posts were attacked, and in response, the army bombed some villages once again.<sup>18</sup>

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13 Hesselting, Gerti, and John Eichelsheim. 2009. "Tenure Security in the Periphery of Ziguinchor: The Impact of Politics and Social Relations." In *Legalising Land Rights*, ed. Janine Ubink, 271. Leiden.

14 Beck, Linda J. 2008. *Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal*. Palgrave Macmillan.

15 The Wolof are an ethnic group living in West-central Senegal around and in Dakar. They are the most powerful and influential ethnic group nationwide. The language Wolof is the lingua franca in Senegal. Cruise O'Brien, Donal B. 1998. "The Shadow-Politics of Wolofisation." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36 (1): 25–46.

16 Marut, Jean-Claude. 2010. *Le Conflit De Casamance: Ce Que Disent Les Armes*. Paris: Karthala Editions.

17 Seneweb News. 2011. "Des Éléments Armés S'attaquent Au Cantonnement Militaire De Goudomp." [http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/des-clements-armes-s-rsquo-attaquent-au-cantonnement-militaire-de-goudomp\\_n\\_41949.html](http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/des-clements-armes-s-rsquo-attaquent-au-cantonnement-militaire-de-goudomp_n_41949.html).

18 REWMI Quotidien. 2012. "Bombardement De Positions Rebelles En Casamance." *Leral.net | S'informer En Temps Réel*. [http://www.leral.net/Bombardement-de-positions-rebelles-en-Casamance\\_a25487.html](http://www.leral.net/Bombardement-de-positions-rebelles-en-Casamance_a25487.html); Seneweb News.

2012. "Casamance: trois femmes blessées lors de bombardements aériens." [http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/casamance-trois-femmes-blesees-lors-de-bombardements-aeriens\\_n\\_39920.html](http://www.seneweb.com/news/Societe/casamance-trois-femmes-blesees-lors-de-bombardements-aeriens_n_39920.html).

### Peace-building efforts

Parallel to the rise of violence, civil society efforts to foster a sustainable mediation process and promote peace building multiplied. Since mid-2012 new windows of opportunity for peace in Casamance have emerged thanks to a change in government in Dakar. This change coincided with a willingness shown by the MFDC to enter peace talks;<sup>19</sup> and a growing popular movement pushing for negotiations between the Senegalese government and the MFDC. Lobbying work carried out by the women's organisation *Plateforme de Femmes* during the presidential elections is one such example.<sup>20</sup> The newly elected President, Macky Sall - in office since April 2012 - addressed the Casamance conflict in his inauguration speech and promised to tackle the problem.<sup>21</sup> Since then, President Sall has made the resolution of the conflict one of his top priorities.<sup>22</sup> He has contacted various MFDC factions and involved international mediators, leading to the release of hostages held by the MFDC.<sup>23</sup> All actors, however, seem to be in a gridlock over how to resolve the conflict.<sup>24</sup>

### 2.3. Current nature and scale of forced displacement

In the course of the war (from 1982 to the present day), a total of 3,000-5,000 people have been killed. Some 800 of those are victims of unmapped minefields and isolated mines on roads and villages.<sup>25</sup> In the Casamance region that comprises roughly

> 10,000 urban IDPs  
in Ziguinchor  
> 40,000 IDPs in total  
in the Casamance  
> 20,000 refugees  
in The Gambia & Guinea-Bissau

19 Radio Netherlands Worldwide, Rebel chief in Senegal's restive south agrees to peace talks, 16 July 2012 20SudOnLine. 2012. "Le Mémorandum Qui Attend Les Candidats à La Présidentielle."

[http://www.sudonline.sn/le-memorandum-qui-attend-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle\\_a\\_6729.html](http://www.sudonline.sn/le-memorandum-qui-attend-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle_a_6729.html).

21 Ouestafnews. 2012. "Premier Discours Officiel Du Président Sénégalais, Macky Sall (texte Intégral)." *Ouestaf.com*. [http://www.ouestaf.com/Premier-discours-officiel-du-President-senegalais-Macky-Sall-texte-integral\\_a3928.html](http://www.ouestaf.com/Premier-discours-officiel-du-President-senegalais-Macky-Sall-texte-integral_a3928.html).

22 Foroyaa newspaper, Interview with Macky Sall as President Wade Concedes Defeat, 26 March 2012 23 RFI. 2012a. "Sénégal: la communauté Sant'Egidio confirme son engagement dans le dossier de la Casamance." *RFI*. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120704-senegal-communaute-sant-egidio-confirme-son-engagement-le-dossier-casamance>.

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*RFI*. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120707-senegal-casamance-chef-mfdc-cesar-atoute-badiate-pret-dialogue-dakar>.

———. 2012c. "Les indépendantistes casamançais d'Ousmane Niantang Diatta répondent à Macky Sall." *RFI*. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120712-independantistes-casamancais-ousmane-niantang-diatta-repondent-macky-sall>.

———. 2012d. "Casamance: « la perspective d'une négociation est plus proche que jamais »." *RFI*. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120703-senegal-casamance-perspective-negociation-proche-salif-sadio-mfdc-macky-sall>.

———. 2012e. "Salif Sadio, principal chef de guerre du Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC)." <http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20120703-salif-sadio-principal-chef-guerre-mouvement-forces-democratiques-casamance-mfdc>.

24 According to political analyses local efforts to address the issue of conflict management, reconciliation, or resolution are apparently inefficient. But reality is more complex: in the Casamance, many traditions, such as rituals, institutions, social obligations and others, entail such conflict-management-mechanisms without being explicit. In other words: Despite being hard to detect from a macro-political perspective there are effective conflict management mechanisms in place. For local actors, a variety of possibilities exist to manage the conflict to a limited extent.

25 Numbers from CNAMS, June 2012.

1,750,000<sup>26</sup> inhabitants, 70,000 people were estimated to be displaced at the peak of the crisis in 2007<sup>27</sup>. In 2006, more than 10,000 people tried to escape skirmishes on the border to The Gambia. This phenomenon reappeared in 2009-2012 when a stream of displaced people poured into nearby villages, regional capitals and neighbouring countries. Most recent estimates have ranged between 10,000 and 40,000 IDPs<sup>28</sup> and over 20,000 refugees in neighbouring countries (half in The Gambia, half in Guinea-Bissau). Overall, UNHCR registered 16,742 refugees in 2012.

### **IDPs, Refugees & Returnees**

Recent research conducted by the ICRC estimates that 12,000 urban IDPs are sheltering in Ziguinchor.<sup>29</sup> Other studies have suggested that around 13% of the population of Ziguinchor are refugees and IDPs.<sup>30</sup> Due to the complex patterns of internal and cross-border population movements over time, however, there have been few reliable statistics on forced displacement associated with the Casamance conflict<sup>31</sup>. Displacement has been large-scale and long-term in areas south of the Casamance River, especially along the border with Guinea-Bissau.<sup>32</sup> Some of those IDPs, displaced since 2009, have joined families who were already displaced. Given the long-term nature of displacement, host communities' resources have become extremely stretched. One of the positive effects of displacement on the economy was that livelihoods diversified, and that a part of the rural population was integrated more deeply into the non-agrarian sector.

We suggest looking at the broader category of forcibly displaced groups (looking at both IDPs and refugees together) for a review of the impact of forced displacement in the region. All experts confirmed that differentiating between IDPs and refugees could at times be an artificial exercise. The borders are quite porous and individuals and groups commute easily over the border. Individual and group status may thus at times depend solely on administrative circumstances. Also in the case of return it seems to be problematic to differentiate among returnees along the category refugee, or IDP – or even migrant. The problems returnees encounter are rather linked to their position vis-à-vis the conflict parties and other armed elements than to their flight strategies. We will differentiate among the different groups where relevant and helpful to the analytical approach.

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26 Number from Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD), 2011. *Situation économique et sociale du Sénégal en 2010*, Dakar. The Casamance region, nowadays often called «Casamance naturelle» does not exist as an administrative unit anymore. Today the former region Casamance has been replaced with the regions Kolda, Sedhiou and Ziguinchor. Mostly affected by the conflict are the latter two regions.

27 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2012, *Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments*.

28 Ibid.


29 Interview M. Maurer 12/2012, internal ICRC study 2012.

30 Robin, N., 2006, *Le déracinement des populations en Casamance*, Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, vol. 22 numéro 6. There is large number of refugees from Guinea-Bissau living in the Southern suburbs of Ziguinchor, which is hardly ever acknowledged. Nevertheless their presence increases the pressure on the already strained labour market of Ziguinchor and also on social and medical assistance available in town.

31 The number of IDPs is estimated to be higher than most estimates, as long-term IDPs are mostly overlooked. This is also in line if we compare the ICRC estimate for Ziguinchor (12,000 IDPs) with the lower end of the range 10,000-40,000 for the whole Casamance.

32 Evans, Martin, 2007, 'The Suffering is Too Great': Urban Internally Displaced Persons in the Casamance Conflict, Senegal.

## IDPs, Refugees & Returnees



### Security situation

The nature and scale of displacement varies significantly between different areas in the Casamance. The Lower Casamance (Ziguinchor region) is a stretch of approximately 60 x 60 miles with 713,440 inhabitants.<sup>33</sup> Despite its small size, it is a mosaic of varied political, socio-cultural, and militaristic realities. Most of the conflict-related incidents occur in the Ziguinchor region. Local realities have to be acknowledged and projects must be designed accordingly to address problems adequately. The following table differentiates four setting to provide an operational categorisation. This categorisation is considered to give a better insight into the different security situations and the consequences of such differences. The varying levels of insecurity can be differentiated into a) zones where major combats occur, b) zones which are controlled by the MFDC and are off-limit for the Senegalese army, c) zones in which raids, hold-ups, and attacks on individuals are common, and d) areas where direct exposure to violence is rather rare.<sup>34</sup>

### Zones of large-scale military operations and combats.<sup>35</sup>

Area: CR Sindian, CR Oulampane, CR Bounkiling (région Sédhiou)

33 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie - Publications SES Régions. 2010. *Situation Economique Et Sociale De La Region De Ziguinchor*. Dakar. [http://www.ansd.sn/publications\\_SES\\_region.html](http://www.ansd.sn/publications_SES_region.html). Most statistical data available still refers to Kolda and Ziguinchor only – because the region Sédhiou did not exist then. Accordingly the data for Sédhiou is listed within Kolda cf. Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie - Publications SES Régions. 2009. *Situation Economique Et Sociale De La Region De Kolda*. Dakar. [http://www.ansd.sn/publications\\_SES\\_region.html](http://www.ansd.sn/publications_SES_region.html).

34 For a detailed historic account of the conflict, battles, military and geopolitical tactics please consult Marut, Jean-Claude. *Le Conflit De Casamance: Ce Que Disent Les Armes*. Paris: Karthala Editions, 2010; and: Evans, Martin, 2004, *Sénégal: Mouvement Des Forces Démocratiques De La Casamance (MFDC)*. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

35 A detailed table differentiating the zones is found in the appendix.

This area is currently characterized by the presence of three different MFDC factions that are at enmity with each other. A highly volatile situation leads to repeated displacement. To cope, civilians engage in trans border traffic and try to diversify their livelihoods by smuggling to The Gambia. This area is virtually cut off from the Senegalese administration. There are few functioning schools as teachers refuse to work in the area. Many school buildings are destroyed. Due to the lack of educational facilities and a high level of unemployment, young men are especially at risk of engaging in illicit activities such as Cannabis production and trade or timber smuggling.

***Zones partially off limits to the military.***

Area: CR Sindian, CR Diouloulou, CR Djinaky

In these Communautés Rurales, certain zones are off limit to the military. Based on an agreement between the MFDC (Jakai faction) with the army, a form of self-government was established in the villages and as the combats stopped in the 1990s displacement also halted. Today the local President of the CR is a well-accepted mediator between the zone and state structures. However, risks of attacks remain as different factions of the MFDC have been splitting up into factions that display different approaches. After years of a relative stable cease-fire between the army and the Jakai faction, attacks on soldiers on the outskirts of Bignona and Ziguinchor seemingly included combatants from this very faction.

***Zones of frequent raids, hold-ups, and attacks on individuals.***

Area: CR Santhiaba Mandjak, CR Nyassia, CR Niaguis, CR Boutoupa-Camarakounda, CR Adeane, CR Djibanar (région Sédhiou)

On the border with Guinea-Bissau in the South the situation is quite different. The number of skirmishes between the army and the MFDC has diminished significantly since 2006. Nevertheless complicated trans border relations and a lot of mistrust between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal endure. Many villages along the border are abandoned. Many areas are mined and threats of attacks on civilians remain high. Criminal groups operate in the area preventing farmers from accessing their fields. The risk to loose livestock is probably the highest in this area.<sup>36</sup>

***Zones affected by sporadic violence***

All other communities of the Ziguinchor region are exposed to sporadic violence. The insecurity has different consequences: (i) The population in general is traumatized, afraid of hold-ups, assaults, and combats. (ii) The problem of displacement, return, denunciations, and mistrust are matters that negatively affect social cohesion. (iii) Insecurity blocks efforts to tackle pending problems like missing infrastructure, lack of educational opportunities and a saturated labour market. (iv) These factors put an additional strain on the civilian population and fuel the growth of illicit activities, which sustain the conflict (cf. CdN).

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<sup>36</sup> Please consult the appendix for further details on crucial differences between different parts of this zone that should be kept in mind.



#### 2.4. Access to land and services

Information on access to services enjoyed by displaced groups is limited and mostly restricted to specialized agencies' reports in the aftermath of new displacement flows.<sup>37</sup> IDPs do not enjoy different treatment from non-displaced groups by the state. No programs for IDPs have been adapted to re-establish destroyed infrastructure or provide long-term assistance where needed. Emergency aid for IDPs is provided by international organisations like ICRC, WFP, and various NGOs. But after the initial help, IDPs "are lost in the bush" (Bigirima, WFP, CdN). Refugees arriving in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau are self-settled and receive help from UNHCR and other international organisations.

The question of vital access to land is pending for both refugees and IDPs. Addressing land tenure and property rights appears critical in the Casamance context. Housing, land and property are all key issues to understanding the political economy of forced displacement in Casamance. They are at the heart of the conflict and instrumental in guaranteeing livelihood opportunities and durable solutions for displaced populations. HLP have to be analysed from different angles. A historical perspective shows the past grievances around land. There have been (i) disputes between villages over the scarce cultivable land long before the escalation of the Casamance conflict; (ii) clashes with the colonial government over the question of land use and land taxes before independence; and (iii) expropriations and disputes linked to the new law of national domain shortly before the violent turn of the conflict.<sup>38</sup> Analysis of the current situation regarding access to land shows that landmines and the security situation pose major obstacles to land use.<sup>39</sup> Review of IDPs' coping mechanisms demonstrates local flexibility in adapting to shifting land tenure mechanisms and settlement habits.<sup>40</sup> The bottom line is that reduced access to land has a direct impact in limiting livelihood strategies for both displaced and non-displaced groups in rural areas and in towns.

A thorough study of traditional and modern land legislation, application and consequences would be beneficial for projects that want to address the pending question of unresolved land disputes. Any peace-building initiative will have to deal with this issue because it is a factor that is nurturing the conflict. Observations indicate that the question of land tenure legislation does not only concern the IDPs. Land tenure legislation problems encompass the whole population. The parallel existence of statutory and customary land rights is generally problematic. The Senegalese law of *national domain*, passed at the beginning of the conflict, is in practice virtually confined to urban and touristic areas. But even in these areas, legislation does not eliminate land disputes.

37 NRC/IDMC, 2010, New displacement and challenges to durable solutions in Casamance.

38 Robin, Nelly, and Babacar Ndione. 2006. *L'accès Au Foncier En Casamance. L'enjeu D'une Paix Durable ?* IRD/ Handicap International. Dakar: IRD/ Handicap International.

39 Robin, Nelly & Ndione, Babacar, 2006, *ibidem* ; Robin, Nelly, 2006. 'Le Déracinement Des Populations En Casamance'. *Revue Européenne Des Migrations Internationales* 22 (1): 153-181; Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Country Profiles : Senegal 2011, 2012 .

40 Evans, Martin. 2009. 'Flexibility in Return, Reconstruction and Livelihoods in Displaced Villages in Casamance, Senegal'. *GeoJournal* 74 (6) (January 6): 507-524.

### Legal status of land titles

The crucial point for the situation of IDPs and refugees is that no state institutions effectively guarantee the (legal) status of their land titles (also in Guinea-Bissau the system land titles lacks transparency). Virtually all displaced are farmers or have a rural background. Out of solidarity – and due to the need of the hosts to provide for the displaced – most displaced are given a piece of land if they stay in the villages of refuge for a while. This means that usually a small territory is given to the displaced to build a house in the villages. Mostly, a small garden comes with this plot. Sometimes farmland is given to those displaced; sometimes they are exploited to clear the bush. How much land is given depends on the availability of land, the accessibility and the goodwill of the hosts. The size furthermore varies according to the degree of individually perceived social obligation, which in turn is often related to the degree of family bonds or ethnic ties.<sup>41</sup>

The practice to lease rather than sell land is typical for the traditional land tenure systems throughout the region (cf. V.1: *adjati*-system). Traditionally, everyone has to rely on the autochthons to be granted a land title. On a village level, such a title is as secure as all other traditional land titles in the region. The registration of the plot of land for a legal entitlement is often neglected. But the fact that land titles are held by autochthon “first-comers” rather than guaranteed by modern legislation has brought a new dimension for the IDPs and refugees. The refugees are exposed to possible discrimination concerning access to land and how this is regulated – e.g. land titles - by the autochthons and the authorities due to their ambiguous (social and legal) status as residents in the place of refuge across the border.

### 2.5. Vulnerable groups and risks of impoverishment

Observations indicate, that a) single mother households are especially vulnerable; b) the role of men as providers of the family and in consequence gender relations as a whole are strained; c) young men are likely to engage in illicit activities in order to live up to the expectations they are confronted with. These vulnerabilities are amplified heavily by displacement, a fact affirmed by the World Bank study “Conflict and Gender in the Casamance” (2012).

According to a 2012 WFP study Casamance is the most vulnerable region in Senegal.

### Change of gender relations

Women (a) are particularly vulnerable if they have to provide for a family alone – a situation that is locally called: *mère et père de famille*. Vulnerability affects all women, but the status of single mothers, and in consequence the effects of the conflict, varies regionally according to the woman’s ethnicity. While the rights of women in Mande dominated areas are rather limited, Diola women may get a plot of land, if they have lost their husband, for example.<sup>42</sup>

41 While some refugees praise their hosts for generosity, others complain that the hosts favour their kin group and close family. Some displaced even report that the landowners exploit(ed) them. These refugees explain that they were given land that had to be cleared of bush first and had to give the land back once it could be put to agricultural use (cf. CdN). Some exploitative landowners are reported to be Senegalese refugees who had arrived at the place of refuge in the past.

42 Cf. Conflict and Gender study, p.33ff.

Traditionally, there is a system of mutual help in Diola dominated areas that enables women to exploit the land despite lacking manpower. The villages' association of young men (or immediate kin) can be employed to do the agricultural work for households, which cannot farm their territory due to a lack of manpower. The women are the owners of the land, but they are not entitled to directly inherit it to their children.<sup>43</sup> In other words, even among the Diola, the land given to women is only on lease – women in general, single, divorced, widowed – do not hold land titles. Women therefore often turn to gardens, mostly communal gardens in the villages and smaller gardens in the periphery of Ziguinchor, to provide for basic needs and enable them to engage in commerce.

#### **Men as victims and perpetrators**


Men (b) traditionally have to provide for the family. Men are supposed to act as the head of family households, a position that is based on the command over land, livestock and other resources. Due to this arrangement the men are the ones that lose most in the case of displacement. It is extremely difficult for men to uphold their position and status after displacement. The situation is aggravated by the constrictions of a life in displacement. Respondents reported that the social cohesion of family is strained. This assessment is confirmed by the observation that family conflicts, domestic and gender based violence increase within the group of displaced persons (cf. World Bank report: Gender and conflict in the Casamance, 2012).

#### **Young men at risk of engaging in illegal or violent acts**

For young men (c) at risk of engaging in violence, displacement has far reaching effects. Working and earning a living is usually considered the crucial distinctive feature of manhood. Children and the elderly who have to depend on others are accordingly a separate category. The individuals that are not fully integrated into society as (social) adults – the young men – are therefore at-risk of engaging in violent conflict in order to achieve manhood, or social adulthood. Young men today are recruited for illegal activities by criminal armed gangs simply because they are available and cannot find other sources of income. Many unknown armed elements are for example young former soldiers who have not found employment after leaving the army. The motivation to join the MFDC or armed gangs is often a lack of alternatives to earn a living and the shortage of future opportunities in general.

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43 Only the paternal family can give the land to the male heirs of the deceased father.



Source: WFP 2012. Prevalence of food insecurity zone of risk (ZAR) per région.<sup>44</sup>

According to the proposed extended model of impoverishment, risk and reconstruction, IDPs are confronted with the following patterns of impoverishments, showing how Casamance appears to be the most vulnerable region in Senegal:

a. Landlessness affects a large part of the population. Armed forces and mines block access to agricultural land. The restitution of land is very limited and not attractive to all individuals. Individuals have experienced recurring displacements and are afraid of another displacement. Many IDPs have developed highly flexible ways to use their land during displacement temporarily (either seasonal, part time, or by leasing the fields).

b. Joblessness is prevalent in the region. The economic situation is difficult. Reemployment is mostly offered in the NGO sector or through illicit activities. There exist few possibilities for trained individuals to find a job in the region. The exodus of trained personnel is therefore frequent. IDPs search temporary employment during displacement. Individuals who are better qualified than their hosts – as in the case of refugee groups in Guinea Bissau - sometimes find work across the border. Such cases are, however, rare due to an already saturated job market in both The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. (Qualified) cross-border commuters that had the possibility to find a job outside of Casamance often keep the links to both sides.

c. Homelessness is an issue during the attacks and immediately afterwards. In most cases, displaced groups find refuge with family and/or friends. The government does not provide urgent aid or arrange for accommodation and there is no government-sponsored compensation programme for lost/destroyed property. IDPs have to rent accommodation if they do not want or cannot stay with family or friends. Renting, however, puts additional financial strains on IDPs; if IDPs stay with family and friends, the cohabitation strains the economic and social resources of the hosts.

44 WFP. 2012. Rapport d'évaluation de la sécurité alimentaire dans les zones à risque -Campagne agricole 2011-2012. Dakar.

d. These problems enforce marginalization both during and after displacement. National politics does not offer solutions. A high level of solidarity is observable at the local level. The economic and social position of both hosts and IDPs, however, is precarious and the price for solidarity is a considerable deterioration of living conditions.

e. Food insecurity prevails in the whole region. Refugees, IDPs, returnees, hosts, and most communities in the region (cf. WFP maps, appendix) are equally affected. Adequate food and nutrition during and after displacement is only possible through emergency aid.

f. Weak health systems capacity and limited resources, including lack of skilled personnel in health emergency management, are major constraints affecting efforts to improve health outcomes and reduce morbidity and disability.

g. The loss of common property is often identified as a factor breeding the conflict. The antagonism between official legal rights of land titles and traditional practice of land tenure rest opposed and still exist parallel to each other. Poorer households sustain their livelihoods mostly through resources found on community land. In displacement, such assets are no longer readily available and displaced groups encroach on the hosts' common property resources. It is moreover difficult to ensure the necessary legal framework for joint ventures that are trying to rebuild community structures.

h. The social disarticulation of Casamance's population has increased considerably on a national level. The local population has a weak lobbying power in national politics. The local elite is frail. There are few networks connecting the region to the centre of power in Dakar. The current conflict makes it hard to change this situation. The basis of the civil society is fragile. Social cohesion at the community level in the villages was severely damaged during and after displacement. Reconciliation at the village level is confined to inter-personal efforts. Peacebuilding is limited to traditional means and remains detached from most official efforts.

i. The loss of educational opportunities has been partially addressed with the help of the international community. Schools have been partially rebuilt in zones that seemed safe enough and many new education facilities are offered in the urban centres. Newly established centres for higher education can be found in Ziguinchor. Nevertheless, not all pupils have access to education. Especially in the insecure areas, on the contrary, schools are closed because teachers refuse to work there or because the school buildings are destroyed (again). Many pupils in these areas either do not attend school, or have lost school years. This gap in the curriculum has subsequent negative effects: many young individuals over the age of twenty are still in primary education. In addition, a cautious approach to the exceptionally high number of girls attending school in Ziguinchor region<sup>45</sup> is recommended: there is also an exceptionally high number of female school dropouts amongst girls from displaced families according to our research.<sup>46</sup>

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45 Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD), 2011. *Situation économique et sociale du Sénégal en 2010*, Dakar.

46 A respondent said: „In every single household you look nowadays. All *bonnes* (housemaids) come from the periphery – they all left school“ (Ziguinchor 1/2013).

### 3. Stakeholders and their interests

#### 3.1 Displaced populations and host communities

There are various reasons for displacement in Casamance. The sites, type and intensity of violent events have varied over the course of the last three decades. The reaction of the population has therefore differed, too. In the beginning of the conflict, entire families fled together, meaning that all members departed from a place A and arrived at a place B where they stayed together. The first choice of destination was to stay with close kin. With time, this pattern changed and nowadays the first priority for villagers in the Fogy region, where the last major displacement happened, is to stay as close as possible to the village. During the 1990s, when the level of violence was augmenting, the preference to find a safe place led displaced mostly to Ziguinchor or over the border to seek refuge in the Gambia or Guinea-Bissau. The presence of army or MFDC camps had made it impossible to stay in the village. "Our village was a battleground – bullets flew around us – right here", a respondent declared in a village where people had just started to come back ten years after displacement.

To stay in an insecure area – that means an area where the MFDC is present, an area close to an MFDC camp, or close to a path they use – was often not only dangerous because of the possibility of being caught up in the fighting, but also for other reasons: the MFDC partially financed itself by local pledge drives – an MFDC membership card was given out in return of a regular fee being paid to the movement. This is one example where the dilemma of the villagers is manifest: the civil population was "trapped between the hammer and the anvil" (CdN). If the villager stayed in an insecure area, they were considered supporters of the MFDC by the army. If anybody was found with an MFDC identity card the suspicion was proven (anywhere in Senegal). But if the villagers did not buy the card, they were threatened by the MFDC.

#### Flexible answers to forced displacement

When the government stopped to opt for a militaristic solution and switched to a policy of winning "hearts and minds" – displacement patterns changed. Nowadays, the family is often split up – either women and small children are left behind because they are less likely to be attacked; or men return first, or install themselves close to the abandoned village – because it is the man's work to rebuild the houses; and children of school age are being sent to villages where they can keep up with their studies. There is a variety of flexible and dynamic answers civilians produce in the face of conflict, but a few characteristics of displacement are similar for all displaced groups. Displacement experiences depend on the flight options – if the attacks are coming from one side, the flight will be into the opposite direction. Flight is reactive and IDPs often only arrive at the next village. The safety of the zone of displacement is important for the choice of destination. But the assessment of safety and danger has shifted in the course of time. People have gotten used

We have a pretty bad life here. Why do we have a bad life? Because we cannot go to the rice paddies where the soil is rich. You have to farm around the village. That is our biggest problem. If I had fertile soil I could lay my hands on, there would not be a problem. I know that I could provide for my family without having to pay for a grain of rice with my courage. But the rice paddies are out of reach – because of the insecurity.

(Bilaye, Singuer)

### **Kantapor – Impressions from a displaced village**

Since 2012, Gran Koulaye has been getting bigger. After IDPs from the neighboring villages flocked in, houses have been cramped with people. The school has had to be enlarged. Some women sitting on a great PAM plastic cover help to prepare lunch for the pupils in a provisional open-air kitchen. Next to them, girls play football on the compound.

Gran Koulaye is the last place international donors dare to go according to the villagers. Deliveries of food and other emergency assistance do not pass the small trails that go beyond. But it is worth exploring the area where villages were attacked and destroyed in 2012: far from access to electricity, paved roads and other modern infrastructure, people have returned unnoticed to their destroyed villages.

Kantapor is a sad sight. Next to ruins, women are piling sorghum under a shady tree. The houses in the village were literally leveled to the ground. *"This was the kitchen, here was the bed, that was the marmite. You can still see the plough, the wall crashed down on it and now it is buried in the ground up to the handles, you see? The store was here, all the stocks have been burnt, too,"* villagers explain.

In the ruins of the old school "24. January" is still written the table board. On this day the village came under attack. The new school a few meters away is made out of woven leaves attached to sticks and pieces of half melted ribbed roof. One teacher had returned to Kantapor. Although all books have burned, he manages to educate two-dozen children squeezed into the new provisory classroom.

Children, old men and old women stand in front of their homes. Built a few meters away from the ruins, the new shacks are made out of old ribbed roofs. They are rusty and black. Nothing more than single rooms encased by thin metal. But young men a few steps further away are digging the ground to produce mud bricks. Without any assistance, and although authorities do not want them there, people obviously are coming back to stay.

to being exposed to risks. Economical considerations are a determining factor for decision-making, too. If there is a choice, displaced groups try to minimize existential risks and choose the site of refuge according to the possibility to gain a small income, or do farm work, or engage in fishing.

Most of the time family links exist between the hosts and the displaced (cf. chapter 4). Based on interviews, IDPs often prefer hosts with a similar background (cf. CdN). Most of all for practical reasons – a mutual intelligible language, a similar way of living, common norms of mutual solidarity – all this provides a certain security for the displaced. The logic of intra-family solidarity is a guarantee of strong normative obligations towards family members. This solidarity nevertheless is a trans-ethnic norm and based on the needs and abilities of family members. The choice of hosts often depends only on those criteria. After repeated displacement experiences, many villagers already have established networks – for housing, work, schooling, etc.<sup>47</sup> Some have a house on the other side of the border and have developed alternatives for different scenarios (cf. CdN).

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<sup>47</sup> Today many pupils are, for example, hosted in Sindian because it is the one place where it is guaranteed that classes will not stop and pupils will be accepted.

### 3.2. National and local actors

The conviction that oil, diamonds, gold, precious metals, or other minerals fuel warfare is well established.<sup>48</sup> But analysis of the Casamance war economy has shown that there are no incentives comparable to other conflicts in the region.<sup>49</sup> The argument that a curse of natural resources keeps the violence up therefore does not seem to match the Casamance case: there is illicit trade across the borders with Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. There are hold-ups along the major routes, drug production, and illegal lumber commerce in the Casamance. Young men work at cannabis plantation in areas that are out of reach for the security forces and engage in smuggling and other illicit activities. Often, however, illicit economical activities flourish in regions spared by the conflict just as well (e.g. the Karon islands that are the hub of Marijuana production).<sup>50</sup> In sum, the conflict is not all about the war economy, as this would still thrive under peaceful conditions.

For the entrepreneurs, the illicit trade appears to be more and more sustainable under peaceful conditions. The production and trade of cannabis and illegal timber exploitations are thriving in areas that are completely untouched by the conflict (e.g. Karon islands) – a correlation of illicit revenues and conflict is therefore not evident. The conflict therefore cannot be attributed to a simple logic of being induced by outside interest groups who would lose their access to revenues. It is a conflict about resources of a second order – generated by the conflict.

These revenues generated by the conflict can be differentiated into four categories: (i) the banditry in the region; (ii) the timber trade of the military; (iii) the revenues of the MFDC, and (iv) the market of peace. Without the conflict, bandits that are living off the population along the Southern border would neither have a safe haven, nor would common criminals that are raiding villages have the chance to blame the MFDC.<sup>51</sup> The trade of timber by the military could not flourish in a situation of peace. The MFDC could not generate the revenues it managed to attract during the last decades. And a so-called market of peace, which is consisting of the individuals and organisations that act as peace brokers or peace-builders, would cease to exist.

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48 Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler. 2004. *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. Oxford Univ Press. Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. 'Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 508–537. Lujala, Päivi. 2008. 'Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict.' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (1) (November): 50–71. doi:10.1177/0022002708327644.

49 Evans, Martin. 2002. *The Political Economy of War in the Casamance*. Working Paper. SOAS, London.

———, 2005. 'Insecurity or Isolation? Natural Resources and Livelihoods in Lower Casamance.' *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39 (2): 282–312.


50 The Karon islands are sparsely inhabited islands found south of Kafountine and north of the Casamance River, between the coastline and Thionck Essyl. They are difficult to access and have been virtually untouched by combats.

51 Unidentified armed groups attacked Diogue twice. The MFDC was blamed, ethnic tensions in the village attacked followed, but in the end the criminals were caught – they evidently had no connection to the MFDC (Rudolf, et.al. 2012: Gender and conflict in the Casamance, WB). The research group in Djibanar reported similar examples (cf. Cdn 2013).



### Periphery status

In light of the lack of resources, a recurring narrative to explain the conflict is the opposition to central power that is said to be typical for the *Casamançais*, in particular for the Diola. According to this argument, the allocation of political offices to *Northerners* is explained by the Diola's historical hostility towards authority. It has been shown on the contrary that distance to the centre of power is due to lack of a local *Casamançais* elite.<sup>52</sup> The concentration of power in the hands of *Northerners* became problematic when land was expropriated and reallocated,<sup>53</sup> when agriculture was modernised and sacred forests (*bois sacré*) declared to be potential resources for timber.



The claim that Casamance features a historic hostility towards central power is more of a political discourse than an explanation for the conflict. The fragmentation of the MFDC and the paternalistic divide-and-rule tactic do complement each other. The atomisation of Casamance on one hand and the paternalistic, centralised structure on the other hand nourish the violent conflict and impede the development of a powerful peacebuilding process.

The conflict-contributing factors in Casamance are diverse. The spiral of violence developed and turned into an apparently never-ending conflict. Peculiar in this conflict is the fact that peace brokers and violent actors do ensure their economic survival mutually. In other words:

52 Beck stresses this argument: "...what distinguishes Casamance politics from the shared experiences of other peripheral regions is the absence of a customary political class that limits the authority of local elites", Beck, Linda J., 2008, *Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 162.

53 Hesselting, Gerti. 1991. 'Urban Land Conflicts and the Administration of Justice in Ziguinchor'. *Netherlands Review of Development Studies* 3.

both the insistence on violence and the negotiation of peace are rational tactics through which actors do achieve their means.

### **Market of peace**

The failure to resolve the conflict is an established fact in Casamance for thirty years now. The conglomeration of peace-building NGOs, international agencies, local counterparts, experts, and activities in Casamance locally is called *marché de la paix*<sup>54</sup> [market of peace]. In the *marché de la paix*, contrary to the market of violence,<sup>55</sup> a violent entrepreneur abstains from violence in exchange for goods. Nevertheless, he is coercing, and benefitting from coercion just as actors in the market of violence.

The market of peace consists of the State, the MFDC, and peace brokers. The contested resource is peace and the benefits of political nature. The unique peculiarity of the conflict is that the state in fact sponsored the rebel groups.<sup>56</sup> Observation showed that the market place of peace is firstly characterized by a thriving economy of fear based on the possible use of uncontrollable violence, and secondly seems to be based on the lack of an institutionalised monopoly of violence and missing established and binding institutions for conflict resolution. It became furthermore visible that a perceptible effect is that actors from the local level are related with actors on the national level in a system of mutual threat and negotiation. This *marché de la paix* would cease to exist without the crisis. There is therefore a high structural resistance to any efforts of conflict resolution, which has evolved after the long period of conflict.

Nevertheless analysis shows how on a micro-level a rather fragile mediation model can be found. It is working and in place. Flexible and functioning conflict management structures can be found at the local level. A complex equilibrium seems to have been established: the frameworks of traditional mediation give the local population of Casamance means to lessen their grievances, but impede – due to the non-hierarchical and decentralised structure – any final and general peace agreement.

### **3.3. Transnational issues and geopolitics**

Apart from contemporary geopolitical links, Casamance has historical ties to neighbouring Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. In terms of discourses on colonial history, cultural communalities and genealogical origins, those links connect the respective regions more amongst each other than to northern Senegal. Due to refugee movements and shifts in borderlines, many people have found themselves or their relatives on the changing sides of the border. These historic and recent experiences might be one reason why the *Casamançais*

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54 *Marché de la paix* is the local term. Market of peace is the English synonym. It is argued that it is a sub form of the market of violence with a different notion. The term is stressing the factor fear instead of violence.

55 "Behind smoke screens of ethnic, political, religious or other ideological goals appears a new – mainly economic – reference for social action: acquisition based upon violence. Markets of violence are highly profitable social systems, which can remain stable over several decades. The dominant actors in this system, the warlords, combine violent appropriation with peaceful exchange." Elwert, Georg. 2003. 'Intervention in Markets of Violence.' In *Potentials of Disorder*, ed. Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher. Manchester: Manchester University Press: p.1f.

56 Marut, Jean-Claude. 2010. *Le Conflit De Casamance: Ce Que Disent Les Armes*. Paris: Karthala Editions: P.177ff.

stress similarities rather than differences with the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. This becomes particularly obvious at the border where local and regional identifications clearly supersede national ones, and trans-border (and transnational) similarities, common descent, and family ties are emphasized instead.

Someone may own a house in the Gambia and be registered to vote in Senegal, live one side of the border and farm his land on the other. Infrastructure (schools, hospitals etc.) is used wherever it is perceived to function better. Other means to pin down national identification are accommodated to situational demands by the individual citizen. People often hold several IDs and therefore the right to vote is not confined to one state only. To access one's home region in Northern Casamance (Senegal), it facilitates things to have a Gambian ID, residence and currency – Gambian border patrols are less harsh on Gambian ID holders, while the Senegalese only rarely patrol the border in that region. The displaced can therefore resort to established networks and walk on well-trodden paths.<sup>57</sup>

#### ***Drug trade and international involvement***

The compilation of notes shows a variety of opinions on the matter of drug trade in the region. In line with arguments of Foucher (CdN) and Marut, the authors are cautious to engage in speculations on international drug cartels supporting the MFDC. As long as there is no evidence to support the claims, they have to be dismissed.


International drug trade (cocaine) has to be differentiated from local Cannabis commerce. Cannabis is cultivated in Casamance and sold in the sub-region. The cocaine trade affects Guinea-Bissau heavily and is transported north, passing to Europe. Common sense suggests that smugglers will evade a region where checkpoints, controls and security forces are concentrated. Experts that are engaged in anti-drug work confirm that the trading route passes through Guinea-Conakry and not Casamance. Supportive regimes have ceased to exist (namely Gbagbo's Ivory Coast) – or have different priorities by now (Iran). The MFDC played only a minor role in international politics – effects of international current affairs are therefore not yet noticeable.

Changes in international politics have changed the cards for the Gambia and isolated President Jammeh internationally. This affects the MFDC indirectly. Whatever happens in the neighbouring countries does affect Casamance strongly and vice versa. It impacts the necessary flux of arms, and a possibility for illicit trade to maintain a small war economy. The

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<sup>57</sup> In the Fogny region, which lies on both sides of the Senegalese-Gambian border, Gambian currency is widespread on both sides of the border and Gambian public transport connects every village on both sides directly with Gambian traffic hubs. Just 100 kilometres farther South, on the border between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, the situation is virtually the same. In the Kasa region in the Southern Casamance Senegalese refugees living in Guinea-Bissau cross the green border to Senegal to take advantage from better health care, market prices or educational facilities. This flexible approach to citizenship is not exclusive for the *Casamançais*: In the Karon region for example, at the far northwest of the Casamance, many Gambians have their livelihoods with some of their children going to school there, while other cross the border to go to school in Senegal. In Ziguinchor, the capital of the Casamance, a whole neighbourhood (Tilene) is comprised mostly of people from nearby villages in northern Guinea-Bissau. They nevertheless stay closely involved in their home regions. In summary: Villages and people on these borders, being officially separated by it, commute and communicate across the borderline in a truly transnational fashion in their daily life.

neighbours are furthermore of the uttermost importance as a place of refuge, exile, for strategic withdrawals, to find allies and build up networks.



### Geopolitics

After the recent civil war, whose cause and course is strongly entangled with the situation north of its borders, Guinea-Bissau has been called a state without government. This development is considered by international monitoring groups to be the biggest question mark for the future of the region.<sup>58</sup> At the same time, the ambiguous position of the Gambia towards the last stronghold of the uncompromising rebel faction around Salif Sadio doesn't improve the situation in Casamance either. President Jammeh is of Diola origin and has developed a courtyard in his village Kanilai that can be considered a factual parallel capital. This village is situated right on the border with Senegal and a stone throw away from the supposed camp of MFDC's Salif Sadio. These proximities do raise concerns about which side the Gambia is on.

Jammeh's style of governance can be called erratic, and so can be the policy of the Guinea-Bissau government. For the MFDC, this means that they do not get a stable support by any of the neighbouring countries. Yet they can rely on the fact that Banjul and Bissau are not anxious to extinguish the MFDC for reasons of national and international politics. Jammeh repeatedly accused Senegal to have staged coups to oust him from office, and wide parts of Bissau's military are critical of Senegal's influence in their country. The small Senegalese

58 International Crisis Group. 2008. 'Guinée-Bissau: Besoin D'état'. *Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State* 142. internal-pdf://ICG\_2008\_Guinee-Bissau\_besoin\_d'etat-0703114752/ICG\_2008\_Guinee-Bissau\_besoin\_d'etat.pdf; International Crisis Group. 2009a. 'Guinée-Bissau: Construire Un Véritable Pacte de Stabilité'. *Policy Briefing / Briefing Afrique* 57. internal-pdf://ICG\_2009\_Guinee-Bissau\_construire\_un\_veritable-2766713088/ICG\_2009\_Guinee-Bissau\_construire\_un\_veritable.pdf; International Crisis Group. 2009b. 'Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun'. *Policy Briefing / Africa Briefing* 61. internal-pdf://ICG\_2009\_Guinea-Bissau\_Beyond\_rule-2179510016/ICG\_2009\_Guinea-Bissau\_Beyond\_rule.pdf; World Bank, 2011. *Conflict Security and Development - World Development Report 2011*. Washington DC: World Bank Publications.

neighbors are reluctant to give up the only powerful leverage that is available against the Senegalese government. Also in internal struggles power holders in the Gambia or Guinea-Bissau resort to the MFDC is a potent ally.<sup>59</sup> This is evident looking at the location of the rebel camps. All of the rebel camps are found close to the borders (cf. map above).

In sum, to achieve a durable peace means that Banjul and Bissau have to be integrated. The incumbent government in Bissau is in tune with the Senegalese - "they play the game of the Senegalese" (Foucher, CdN 2013) regarding international affairs. Nevertheless the ruling military class is far from being united – existing ties to the MFDC are still in place. Political actors unanimously confirmed that the Gambian President has far reaching contacts in the MFDC (cf. Sagna, CdN 2013). Most experts furthermore agree that his support has been vital for the MFDC in the last years.

## 4. Durable solutions

### 4.1. Types and characteristics of displacement

Only a few sources link forced displacement to reconstruction and development efforts<sup>60</sup> and these are presented in general terms. The current literature<sup>61</sup> seems to stress the need of displaced groups and thus focus on their vulnerability(ies) rather than looking at their capacities and thus interpreting them as agents of power themselves.

#### Numbers and ambiguities

A review of the data available on the number and patterns of displacement is the basis to understand the impact of forced displacement on society and the degree of impoverishment risks as classified by Cernea<sup>62</sup> and to develop targeted programmes.<sup>63</sup> However, due to complex patterns of internal and cross-border population movements over time, there have been few reliable statistics on forced displacement associated with the Casamance conflict. The reasons why there are no clear and established numbers of refugees in Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia are manifold: A) as stressed, many families have ethnic and family ties on both sides of the border; B) it is difficult to assess the level of local integration for those who settled in the neighbouring countries long ago as they found work, raised their children and

59 Putschist Mane fortified his hold on power thanks to the engagement of the MFDC in 1999 in Bissau, and Jammeh probably plots to fall back on the MFDC in the case of an eventual coup d'état.

60 ProCas-GTZ, 2008, *Etude sur la réintégration des retournés dans les régions de Kolda, Sédiou et Ziguinchor*, 2010.

61 Hopkins, Gail. 2011. 'Casamance Refugees in The Gambia: Self-settlement and the Challenges of Integration'. UNHCR, Research Paper No. 220; Ray, Charlotte, 2012, *Challenging the Classical Parameters of 'Doing Politics': The Case of Casamance Refugees in the Gambia*, Manuscript; Conway, Carrie. 2004. *Refugee Livelihoods: A Case Study of the Gambia*. UNHCR; Marut, Jean-Claude. 1996. 'La Rébellion Casamançaise Peut-elle En Finir'. *Afrique Contemporaine, Décembre*; Gehrold, Stefan, and Inga Neu. 2013. *Caught Between Two Fronts - In Search of Lasting Peace in the Casamance Region*. KAS International Reports 10/2010. Accessed March 15; WFP. 2007. *Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation*. Dakar; WFP. 2007. *Impact et rôles futures de l'aide alimentaire en Casamance naturelle*. Dakar; OCHA, 2006, "Monthly situation report".

62 Cernea, Michael M. 2004. 'Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management, and Reconstruction: A Model of Population Displacement and Resettlement'. In *UN Symposium on Hydropower and Sustainable Development, Beijing (27-29 October)*.

63 NRC/ IDMC/ OCHA. 2008. *Guidance on Profiling Internally Displaced Persons, OCHA-NRC, English.pdf*. Geneva: OCHA-NRC.

'permanently' settled there.<sup>64</sup> This group of (mostly urban) long-term displaced persons does blend in perfectly, as e.g. *Casamançais* in the Serrekunda area (The Gambia), and does not appear in any refugee statistics. Nevertheless there are indicators suggesting that this group is large; C) there is a high level of under-registration as many who settle along the border prefer to remain anonymous.

During the interviews and FGDs, the differentiation between 'visitor', migrant and displaced was blurry. It seemed as if only the refugees that were organized and in contact with organisations like UNHCR were outspoken about their status.<sup>65</sup> UNHCR, ICRC and other organisations' staff furthermore acknowledged that individuals register both as refugees and IDPs. Nevertheless, there are other displaced groups that prefer to stay anonymous for reasons of personal security. Apart from individuals living along the borders, there are many urban refugees in the Banjul area and Bissau who prefer to remain anonymous. The urban IDPs that arrived in Dakar are also not counted in any statistics. Official estimates do not include any of these groups. The number of persons that a) have been displaced, or belong to a family that has been displaced due to the conflict during the last thirty years and b) do not return because the on-going conflict is believed to be above the estimates. According to our rough estimation there are over 60,000 persons meeting condition a+b.

#### **Differentiation of IDPs, refugees, returnees and migrants**

According to UNHCR, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia host at least 16,000 Senegalese refugees, largely in rural areas.<sup>66</sup> Not all refugees are, as mentioned, registered and their real number could be larger. The majority of refugees in the Gambia are hosted in the Fogy district close to the border with Casamance. Refugees are highly mobile and move from village to village or to urban areas based on livelihood opportunities and family links. Prior to 2006, many refugees in the Gambia engaged in cyclical flight and return as a response to the sporadic conflict, but the majority has since decided to look at longer-term integration options because of increased danger along the border. The fact that no reliable numbers of returnees are available, is on the one hand due to the fact that many areas of return remain beyond access and that on the other hand many returnees only return part-time.

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64 Sometimes different family members give different declarations on their status as in the following example of a family living in the urban area of Serrekunda: The father declares to be *Casamançais*, his daughter insists being Gambian, proving her point by pointing out she does not even speak French. The mother is undecided - Senegalese, *Casamançais*, or Gambian? She decides her life is in Gambia, therefore she is Gambian, yet her family she explains, is from Baila. The only one who seems to have been a refugee, but does not want to explicitly use the word, seems to be the father (observations in Manjaikunda, 2007-2009).

65 Baker, Bruce. 2002. "Political Sensitivities in Gambian Refugee Policy." *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* 23. ICRC. 2008. "Guinea-Bissau: Food and Seed Distributed to Farmers in North-west." <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/guinea-bissau-050608.htm>; ICRC. 2010. "Senegal: ICRC Delivers Essential Aid to Displaced Persons in Casamance." <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/senegal-news-170510.htm>; ICRC. 2011. "Gambia: Red Cross Assists over 400 Senegalese Refugees." <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2011/gambia-news-2011-03-08.htm>; IRIN. 2004. "Help Needed for Returnees to Casamance." *IRINnews*. <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=48001>; UNHCR. 2004. "Chronology for Diolas in Casamance in Senegal." <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f2f052,469f38d7c,0.html>.

66 UNHCR, 2012, Regional Operations Profile – West Africa.

It is at times difficult to differentiate forced displacement from the phenomenon of rural exodus. Also economic reasons, like missing infrastructure, or no job opportunities are causing a massive 'displacement'. The conflict adds to this rural exodus. Ziguinchor is estimated to have received between 14,000 and 38,000 IDPs over the years (Evans 2004, 2007) and between 10,000 and 14,000 IDPs were still believed to be finding shelter in the city in mid-2010,<sup>67</sup> a number that was confirmed in 2012. Displacement patterns and the presence of local support networks transcend borders and assume a sub-regional aspect with forced displacement becoming inter-linked with economic migration patterns and displaced groups assuming different identities (refugee or IDP or migrant) depending on political developments and the security situation.

A general rural-to-urban migration pattern underlies the flight options of people searching refuge from violence.<sup>68</sup>

A useful approach to distinguishing between voluntary migration and forced displacement to Ziguinchor is applying

age considerations (it is not only the youngest and most resourceful who are coming to the city but also the old and sick).<sup>69</sup> This distinction points to another dimension of the problem: the villages are the social insurance and health care institution for the common Senegalese. In the village nutrition and housing are guaranteed, the cost for childcare, and education are nearly for free, the elderly are cared for, unemployed family members can be accommodated. The village is the last resort for all who cannot afford a city life and have troubles to maintain a family in town.

Many returnees are part of this group. This explains why few families return with all family members. Displacement has triggered a social change that forced significant parts of the rural population to adapt to urban life. Those parts of the rural population that were integrated into the urban labour market do not usually return to the villages. Only parts of the extended family return – often out of the described necessity to diversify family livelihoods. The possibility to resort to more favourable conditions for the education for the children and care of elderly ultimately strengthen the urban integration of the extended family.

**Facts and figures**

**2011**

- About **1500 IDPs** (182 families) were given urgent assistance. 21 projects for urban IDPs in Ziguinchor were created by ICRC (ICRC, 2011, Faits et chiffres 2011)

**2012**

- **20** displaced families in Oulampane district were assisted by ICRC
- **2570** persons affected by displacement in the same zone were assisted by the WFP in Senegal
- **1,276** were displaced, **7** persons killed, **81** destroyed houses, **745** units of livestock lost, in **8** villages according to the NGO Usoforal.

67 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ICRC delivers essential aid to displaced persons in Casamance, 17 May 2010.

68 Awenengo and Foucher (2012) help situate the current dynamics in the regional capital Ziguinchor within historical trends leading back to the demographic boom and the economic crisis of the 1970s.; Foucher, Vincent, and Séverine Awenengo. 2012. 'Les Sciences Sociales Face Au Conflit Casamançais : Quelques Résultats'. *La Gazette*.

69 This is suggested by Evans, Martin. 2007. "'The Suffering Is Too Great': Urban Internally Displaced Persons in the Casamance Conflict, Senegal'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20 (1): 60–85.

### **Patterns of displacement**

Flight is for many villagers a coping strategy to respond to the situation of insecurity. Coping strategies of displaced groups are usually informed by the environment around them and by the length of their initial displacement. Strategies are also informed by gender, age, skills set, etc. so that members within the same family may have employed different concurrent strategies. Elements include:

- Are there direct attacks on the village? Will the village be a battleground?
- Are attacks on nearby villages likely? Is there a chance of being caught up in armed clashes?
- Are there direct attacks on villagers? Do cases of homicide, torture, disappearance, detention, mistreatment, threat, intimidation, GBV or abduction exist?
- Is there a high risk of denunciations, theft, and destruction of property? Have new mines been planted? Is it safe to work in the fields and move around the village? Is there a climate of fear?

The local population may answer these same questions differently according to both personal and external factors. In Balantakunda and Fogny, for example, military camps are evaluated completely differently (cf. II.3). While a military camp close to the village is considered a marker of security in Balantakunda, it is considered a threat to security in Fogny. In Balantakunda, villagers seek refuge directly next to the military camps to have the army in between them and the rebel groups, while in Fogny villagers tend to stay away from the barracks. Villagers hosting the army may also be considered traitors by the MFDC and suffer from retaliatory attacks.

In the border areas, the presence of criminal rings also impacts the choice of coping strategies. Villagers are in fact caught between the Senegalese army, the MFDC and criminal armed gangs, locally called unknown armed elements, and adapt their choice of refuge according to changing criminal targets – e.g. agricultural resources depending on the season, presence of the army along the border, etc. Full time bandits as well as individual fighters from the army, the MFDC, possibly Guinean soldiers, as well as national and international criminals carry out criminal activities along the border. It is important, however, to note the importance of the presence of criminal elements as a separate actor from the MFDC and the army.<sup>70</sup>

Displacement has been large-scale and long-term in areas south of the Casamance River, especially along the border with Guinea-Bissau. Long-term displacement has been accompanied by a pattern of ‘flight and return’ of shorter duration and often repeated over time depending on the security situation. A pattern of ‘pendulum displacement’ whereby IDPs commute to their home areas by day to tend to their orchards and leave for the night was repeatedly described.<sup>71</sup> This pendulum displacement is an expression of different strategies: a) the villagers are settled in a close-by village that is considered safe and work on their fields and plantations by commuting daily to their place of origin; b) villagers go back seasonally –

<sup>70</sup> Rudolf, Markus; et. al. 2012. *Gender and conflict in the Casamance*. World Bank Report.

<sup>71</sup> ProCas-GTZ, 2010, “Etude sur la reintegration des retournés dans les regions de Kolda, Sédiou et Ziguinchor”; NRC/IDMC, 2010, “New displacement and challenges to durable solutions in Casamance”.



they work on a piece of land in their area of displacement and leave for their place of origin over a certain number of days to exploit the fields and plantations there; c) sometimes such a strategy kicks off a partial return of the villagers with men returning first to explore whether conditions are in place for a permanent return and the family to join.

#### **Characteristics of IDP, refugee groups and hosts**

Since 2006, refugee movements towards the Gambia have assumed a more permanent character, mostly due to continued clashes between MFDC elements and the Senegalese army. In 2012 UNHCR registered 1,255 new arrivals from the Sindian and Diouloulou area, taking refuge in the Gambia, following a clearing operation by the army in January 2012. As mentioned above, there are no refugee camps available in the Gambia or Guinea-Bissau. The refugees are not concentrated in one place; there is no structure, no security, no schooling, no housing, no health care, etc. provided for the refugees by international organisations. The neighbouring governments are furthermore reluctant to provide aid to hosts and refugees.

#### **Record of a military operation by the Senegalese army in 2012**

According to an Usoforal study:

**1,276 displaced persons** (men: 340, women: 417, children <18: 519) **from the villages:** Kaloubalou, Wel Moundagne, Wel Kalir, Mararan, Bassène Kanssana, Kaïlon, Dialankine (Kouyi Kaffeinkène), Dioundan Kantapor

**7 Persons died** during displacement

**44 Houses burnt down entirely**

**37 Houses burnt down partially**

Peanuts, corn, sorghum, rice, beans = **Harvest burnt**

195 cattle, 210 sheep, 300 goats, 25 donkeys, 15 horses = **Loss of livestock**

10 seed drills, 30 bull chariots, 15 donkey chariots, 10 horse chariots, 40 hoes, 30 plough = **Loss of agriculture material**

40 cooking pots, 84 bowls, 96 beds, 96 mattresses, 10 barrels of 60 litres each, 8 motor-bikes, 46 bicycles, 205 suitcases, 8 TVs, 16 solar panels = **Loss of household items**

Furthermore 10 fruit plantations, 2 vegetable gardens, and one store with 1025,000f CFA + 29 000 Dalasis of cash, 17 t of rice, 10 x 20l of oil, 10 bags of 50 kg sugar, 60 boxes of soap and divers other products were lost in the **bombardment**

2013 the number of houses that have to be reconstructed rests high: in Dioundan Kantapor 25, Kalir 16, Moundaye 14, and Dialankite (Koui) 17 houses reportedly still had to be reconstructed (According to our IDMC study in January 2013)

The vast majority of displaced people in Casamance and neighbouring Guinea Bissau and the Gambia have sought refuge with family, friends or host communities, with almost 80 per cent seeking refuge with family and friends.<sup>72</sup> Some of those displaced since 2009 have joined families who were they themselves displaced. There is a functioning system of mutual

<sup>72</sup> World Food Programme (WFP), 2007, « Impact et rôles futurs de l'aide alimentaire en Casamance naturelle ».

hospitality in place, not only a norm – this means concretely that the displaced already know on which door to knock. The choice of secondary place of displacement was sometimes made by international aid organisations that have recommended safe places. An exact and global account of the impact of forced displacement on host communities is not available. An exact picture of the CRs where the IDPs are based is also lacking. Further information on the capacities and vulnerabilities of forcibly displaced groups and on how these compare to other groups from the host communities is needed.

### ***Livelihoods of IDPs***

Relationships between displaced groups and their hosts are multi-faceted. IDPs have been relying heavily on help from hosts. Resources are, however, not sufficient for both. Help has often been given only to the displaced – enhancing existing divisions. Reports of IDPs in which they mention mistrust and jealousy indicate rising tensions between the host and the IDP population. Cramped in a few rooms, living off the same stretch of land that used to be just enough for one family, often two or three families have to stretch scarce resources. What was supposed to be temporary emergency aid often turns out to be a permanent solution.

The enduring inability of the state to provide the basic needs of its population in regard to infrastructure, economic growth, and security is named protracted conflict, a term coined by Azar (1990).<sup>73</sup> The Casamance case exemplifies which consequences the failure of the Senegalese state has: felt deprivation sustains a perpetuated circle of violence, and the enduring violence causes waves of displacement. The ICRC distinguishes the following types of IDPs in Casamance:

- Very long term IDPs >10a
- Long term IDPs 5-10a
- Short term IDPs 0-5a
- Temporary IDPs

The patterns of reaction to protracted displacement differ from place to place as mentioned, but a general pattern is that the longer forced displacement lasts, and the more often individuals experience forced displacement the more likely it is that long-term alternatives to return are established. Sometimes integration is achieved in the site of refuge and displaced profit from the relocation caused by forced displacement. Yet often, negative consequences prevail: The longer people have been in displacement the higher their vulnerability and difficulties they encounter in ensuring sustainable livelihoods for themselves and their households. Children of hosts and IDPs in the areas, which suffer the most under the conflict, are extremely vulnerable – they are more often sick, have a long way to school and fall back in class. Often the children of IDPs do not have the possibility to attend school at all, instead

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<sup>73</sup> Azar, Edward E. 1990. *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*. Hampshire, Brookfield: Dartmouth Aldershot.

they have to do hard work, some turn into beggars.<sup>74</sup> Due to the precarious situation of most IDPs, girls drop out school and take up work in urban areas.

IDPs encounter both opportunities and difficulties in their area of displacement both in rural and urban situations. IDPs have higher chances in town than in villages to find paid work. But often this work is precarious and not sufficient to maintain a family. Furthermore most of the time only well-trained individuals find jobs. If displaced find a job, their networks of clients increase after displacement – often they have better opportunities than before. But usually paid work is reserved for autochthons. The rural population that returned is limited to work in agriculture in which they hardly make a profit. But in contrast to urban IDPs they mostly can nourish their family with the joint effort of the family members.

#### 4.2. Prospects and realistic options

While return seems to be the preferred option for both displaced groups and the Senegalese government, displaced groups are exploring all durable solutions. The length of displacement, the evolution of the political process behind the resolution of the conflict, and considerations around livelihood opportunities are important aspects determining the approaches of displaced groups to durable solutions. It is a careful balance of different aspects that push individuals and groups towards one option or the other. In cases where local integration and resettlement, or settlement elsewhere in the country are being pursued, return is not, however, written off altogether.

Despite evidence that displaced seeking ‘an end’ to their integrated and consolidated attainment of durable solutions Casamance. Even in situations able to return, this has not meant automatically ensure access to sustainable livelihoods. A better understanding of the underlying structural causes of displacement and of the opportunities and constraints to durable solutions is a necessary step to address the needs of displaced groups in Casamance, and can also serve as to lay down the foundations for the formulation broader development policy and programming.

“Each and everyone of us wants to return – but the means are lacking.”

groups have increasingly started displacement, there has been no approach to facilitate the by displaced groups in where displaced groups were they have been able to

#### Return options

Our field research and anecdotal evidence have shown IDPs’ desire to return, even after many years in displacement.<sup>75</sup> Casamance has witnessed large return movements since 2004-2006. Whether the return of IDPs has mostly been spontaneous and unassisted, or has been

74 Gueye D., 2009, « Etude sur les pires formes de travail des enfants dans des situations de conflit et de post conflit : les effets de la crise casamançaise sur le travail des enfants dans les communes de Goudomp et de Ziguinchor ». Rapport à ENDA, Université de Bradford (UK).

75 Cf. Jeune Afrique/ l’Intelligent.com, 2009. « Casamance : pour les déplacés, la guerre continue ». There has been no comprehensive survey of their intentions with regard to settlement options, or on how many have successfully locally integrated or settled nearby or elsewhere in the country.

facilitated by development funding, remains disputed.<sup>76</sup> Return has been ongoing at varying rates since at least 2001. IDPs initially started returning to villages closer to Ziguinchor, and gradually returned into rural areas. Rates of return have accelerated in the past few years, as many families and communities have copied the example of the first individual families who returned. Returnees initially maintain a foothold in their place of displacement to ensure a continued access to livelihoods while reconstructing their homes and restarting agricultural production in their areas of return. Where the distance between areas of displacement and return makes commuting difficult, such as along the border with Guinea-Bissau, some returnees have built temporary shelters close to their former homes and used them as a base despite the poor living conditions.<sup>77</sup>

Displacement and return occur out of necessity. Displaced persons will only come back if economical incentives are given and if physical integrity is assured. Return movements are based on a number of **push and pull factors**. With livelihoods lost in displacement, the costs of an urban life exceed the costs in the village (schooling, transport, nutrition). Public services are not available in the most insecure areas – civil servants have fled and refuse to come back. The necessity, or desire to return is obstructed by the missing infrastructure of the rural areas. A majority of those interviewed adopted different return strategies within the household: daily or seasonal ‘return commuting’ or family separation with male heads of households assessing or preparing the ground for the return of the whole family. Fear of mines, reprisals or persecution will also hold individuals and groups from returning to their home villages.

For civilians that are not involved with the MFDC the fact that they stayed in exile is often suspicious for Senegalese authorities. Other obstacles to return include: insecurity, on-going violence, hold-ups, mine incidents. People experience assaults, theft of livestock and raids of harvest (cf. CdN). They are aware that there is no peace treaty in place that has been accepted by all parties. The population is afraid of being in between the lines, being denounced, tortured, or imprisoned because they have experienced this before.

#### **Local integration**

Many factors will also inform the choice of displaced groups to integrate locally or resettle elsewhere. Most of them are linked to livelihood and education opportunities: factors include security, social networks, jobs, services and property ownership at their current residence. Younger generations who have grown up in urban contexts often do not want to return to rural areas: they lack the necessary training and skills to work in the agricultural sector, especially when plots of land have not been tended for years. In addition it is difficult to go back to the life of before, once accustomed to urban life. Some individuals have found a better living in town, or on the other side of the border. Schools, electricity healthcare, jobs – or nightclubs – that are present in town do not exist in villages that have to be reconstructed completely.

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76 Fall, Assiatou. 2011. ‘Understanding The Casamance Conflict: A Background’. Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana; Jeune Afrique/l’Intelligent, « Casamance: réfugiés et déplacés voudraient rentrer mais ont toujours peur », 6 June 2011.

77 Evans, Martin. 2009. ‘Flexibility in Return, Reconstruction and Livelihoods in Displaced Villages in Casamance, Senegal’. *GeoJournal* 74 (6) (January 6): 507–524.

While legal status plays a role in informing options around local integration for displaced populations, practical considerations remain the same. Even where, for example, the host government – as in the case of the Gambia – allows Casamance refugees to hold refugee status indefinitely, obstacles to local integration are most often identified as the inability to work the land because of: (i) the lack of appropriate tools, or (ii) because of the less fertile quality of the land, or (iii) because of limited access to education that could open up avenues for more skilled types of labour opportunities. It is important to note, that, in the context of self-settled displaced groups, as in the case of those from Casamance, the interests of the local/host population in facilitating the achievement of local integration as a solution to displacement are key. The willingness of the host population to accept local integration depends on who wins and who loses. In most cases, the hosts' interests include security, a reduced burden on community resources and the environment and local economic development.

#### **What it means to live in a situation of neither war nor peace**

Toubakouta's population was repeatedly **displaced**: "*...it was not easy for us when we escaped from the village. That is nothing you like to talk about at all. We had to take flight head over heels. We did not even take a shirt with us. We stood in the street with nothing. We were carrying our children on our back*" (Binta, Toubakouta).

But in **exile** matters were difficult for the displaced: "*We suffered a lot during the crisis. Men suffered. But not like us, the women. Some people are traumatised and some even died. We suffered in Ziguinchor – it was terrible. Sometimes 10 people slept in the same room. For dinner there were 15 people gathering around a small bowl. That was not pleasant to see. We could not get enough food*" (Yama, Toubakouta). Due to these difficulties, villagers started to come back after the situation calmed down in late 2006.

In 2009 the **returnees** were determined to stay – but they faced significant problems as the village chief explained: "*You know, the population would love to come back. But the means are lacking to reconstruct the houses. We get along as good as possible. But once you have finished the construction and the roof isn't there yet – everything tumbles down again. And it is very difficult to encourage others to come back – they are afraid*" (Yaya, village chief, Toubakouta).

The **urban IDPs** explained that they remained worried: "*We are obliged to return. Life is too expensive in town. But would I manage? A single mother? Without a man? You always have doubts – will they attack my house again? People say the war is over in the radio. But do they know what is in the head of the persons that stay in the bush?*" (Laura, Ziguinchor).

Such doubts were affirmed in 2012 when **armed groups barred the villagers from access to the fields during the harvest** and farmers remained empty-handed.

### **Resettlement or relocation**

For refugee groups, the option of resettlement is informed by the willingness of third countries to provide for such an option. In the case of IDPs, some of the reasons and some of the challenges are common to those seen above in the case of local integration. It is important to mention here, however, the phenomenon of mixed migration as an opportunity to contribute to ending displacement. Such a phenomenon, has been, however, understudied in this context. In the case of the Casamance displacement situation, migration has played an important role, as we have seen above, in economic, social and cultural relations and such movements occur alongside displacement, most often as a response to protracted displacement. Though we are unable to quantify it, our field research hinted at a very large group of *Casamançais* currently living in Dakar. Mobility that occurs both during and after displacement has been seen to have positive effects both on peace-building efforts and on development agendas, including through the role of remittances and through programmes that reflect the likely permanence of rural-urban flows.<sup>78</sup> In the case of Casamance, regional mobility assumes an even more strategic role with the ECOWAS protocol on free movement that facilitates mobility across ECOWAS countries.

### **4.3. Scenarios**

Recognising that durable solutions are informed by a variety of factors that can be shaped differently over time and according to external factors, a short overview over the a) best, b) worst, and c) most likely scenarios may be useful. Either: A) the tactic of the former Senegalese government to wait and see will continue. As the MFDC does not have sufficient means to sustain itself over a prolonged period of time, this tactic will prove demoralizing. The events observed in 2009 would probably reoccur and arms – either laid down (Front Nord) or silenced (Salif Sadio) – will be used again; or: B) the combatants are offered an honourable integration and alternative livelihoods (that exceed the income generated by violent means). This option has to be accompanied by an amnesty and political recognition for the combatants. In the most likely case C) a combination of both scenarios will occur.

#### **Best scenario**

In the best case, regional power holders reach an agreement. Compliance with the agreement is honoured with certain benefits, which, in turn, are guaranteed by a third international party. These benefits would be immediately stopped/ withdrawn/ frozen in the case of any support for the MFDC on behalf of Senegal's neighbors, or any violation of the terms of agreement on the Senegalese side respectively.

In an ideal scenario such an agreement is built on mutual trust between Jammeh and Sall. The following political conditions would furthermore be met: (i) good governance is gaining ground in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and the Gambia. (ii) The peace initiatives furthermore carry on and reach all stakeholders, including the combatants. The stakeholders get together at the table of negotiation and engage in mediation efforts and agree to a DDR process. The World Bank peace-building project (SPF: Community Peace-building Initiatives in

78 Cf. Long, Katy. 2011. 'Permanent Crises?: Unlocking the Protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons'. *Policy Overview*, Oxford Department of International Development, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford, UK.

cooperation with ARD Ziguinchor) would finally manage to synergize peace-building initiatives on all levels together with other peace initiatives launched already.

A real reconciliation process addresses the very grievances that are the basis of the crisis and implements measures to tackle the identified problems with local participation and offers exit-option for the combatants – both on a political and economic level. On the development level, decentralisation and a clear program of economic development are implemented and show results on the national macro-level in the best case. This is achieved by providing new infrastructure that dis-enclaves the region. In addition, economic development in the rural sector stops the rural exodus. Education and job training facilities are offered and jobs for qualified personal created. Local ownership of the peace process on the micro-level manage is assured, confidence of the population established, and de-mining pushed This allows the sustainable return of DPs or their resettlement in other areas.

#### **Worst scenario**

In the worst case, on the contrary, the international and national mediators cannot reach the hardliners. The Senegalese government in consequence returns to its policy of ignoring the conflict officially, combined with an unofficial divide and rule tactic based on corruption. International powers maintain a politic of interferences trying to destabilise the region. Local initiatives are intermingled in the “market of peace” and therefore loose credibility among the population and the combatants. The moderate faction in face of this course of events struggles to keep control of their members, further divisions inside the MFDC occur.

The combatants’ readiness to use violence grows in correlation to the weariness they experience caused by the “laisser-pourrir-stratégie” of the state. The MFDC in this case grows more radical, equipment for warfare is restocked, the militaristic organization is improved, further recruitments happen, and a third generation of rebels proliferates. The Casamance economy in the worst case of a re-emerging conflict suffers even more and the gap of development to the rest of Senegal – in particular Dakar – widens. The unemployed young men without perspectives in a vicious cycle turn to the maquis as a lifestyle or opt for clandestine migration – causing more insecurity and a shortage of workforce in agriculture (adding to the agricultural problems).

This means that more violence, more mines, and more military operations cause more displacement, a process that, in turn, makes any return impossible. On top of this, problems like terrorism and drug trade are carried into the Casamance, the MFDC turns into a conglomerate of mercenaries and bandits. The MFDC combatants reach out with their expertise and practice. The sub-region experiences destabilisation caused by marauding small-scale and highly flexible armed groups.

#### **Most likely scenario**

The most likely scenario is a mixture of the two scenarios just outlined. It is most likely that changes will take time and that regional power holders continue a double game. The question of alternatives to a full independence for the Casamance will be debated evermore. The fragmentation of the political and armed wing of the MFDC complicates the process of reaching an agreement. The various parties involved in the mediation do split apart and start

to follow different agendas – possibly giving contra productive incentives to the MFDC to strengthen own position. The problems causing the crisis are not addressed; no true alternative for the combatants is offered and most of the Casamançais remain excluded from the nation-building efforts. These factors make it more and more difficult for the moderate faction of the MFDC to keep their members in line and to maintain military hierarchical structures intact. Unity crumbles. Further divisions occur. Under the surface of a unified command, a lack of leadership is evident.

The more the MFDC splinters the more the *marché de la paix* flourishes again. Mediators compete amongst each others, effectively blocking any long-term peace agreement. The low level of violence will continue to plague the region and the reigning insecurity inhibits any significant changes in the economic development. Non-identified armed groups with a criminal motivation, continue to harass the local population. Mines and camps continue to block access to fertile agricultural land. Attacks on the military, government structures, roads, etc. will continue sporadically, more diversified and less calculable.

If peace talks do not show concrete results quickly a radical militaristic wing will hold out in the bush. Their intention to give up the struggle will be rather hardened by the worsened perspectives of reaching their goals. This in turn means that large areas of cultivable land remain off-limit due to the presence of mines and combatants. The patterns of part-time return – either daily or seasonally – become institutionalised in this case. Due to the absence of alternatives, illicit trade, smuggling, cultivation of cannabis continue to provide necessary income alternatives. Displaced populations – among them especially women headed households – remain vulnerable. Their situation deteriorates due to a lack of alternatives for income opportunities.

## **5. Development challenges**

It is striking that the area that has been most affected by violence and displacement since 2006 corresponds to the area where most national and international aid organizations are absent. In a so-called red zone, only two or three organizations operate permanently while most other organizations do not have direct access to it. In the Djinaki area *CADP* is present, in Sindian *Copi*, in the border area to the Gambia *SJFF* (operating from Biwam/Gambia). These organizations are the only ones besides the ICRC that report to the outside world about the situation of the displaced. It is clear that an engagement in an insecure zone is challenging. The same reasons that constitute an obstacle to the achievement of durable solutions for displaced groups, such as continuing threats of armed clashes and landmines, prevent the meaningful implementation of development program.

The approach adopted by the Senegalese government and the local authorities to include the needs of IDPs into wider reconstruction and development programmes has had the value of acknowledging the protracted nature of the displacement situation in the region and of tackling important components in support to access to livelihoods, such as the development of local infrastructure and increased access to basic services. Such an approach has, however, been implemented without a careful and clear analysis of the underlying interests of both displaced groups and their hosts in support to durable solutions.



In light of the analysis highlighted above, it is evident that most of the development challenges related to forced displacement in Casamance are linked to the lack of livelihoods and education opportunities. Under livelihoods, key stakeholders, refugees, returnees and IDPs interviewed in the course of the field research have mentioned access to land and meaningful employment opportunities as key aspects to guarantee sustainable livelihoods.

### 5.1. Restitution or temporary use of accessible land

Addressing land tenure and property rights appears critical in the Casamance context. With communities basing their livelihood activities mainly on agricultural production, it is obvious why access to land appears mentioned so frequently in the interviews/ FGDs. The agrarian reform and control of land (and natural resources) are not only at the basis of the conflict but they are also instrumental in influencing population movements. In 1964, Senegal introduced a new land legislation trying to move from regulating land rights from a customary to a statutory system in an effort to facilitate private investments. The 1964 law was considered innovative as it did not try to unify the various colonial and customary tenure systems but rather acknowledged their existence and enabled local institutions to define the practical details of implementation of the law at the local level. As conflict-induced displacement has all but accentuated a natural rural exodus to urban areas, it is important to consider the provisions of the 1964 legislation regarding urban land and the impact the convergence of customary adjudication of land rights with statutory provisions has had on access to land by displaced groups.

I would love to come back. But all of my relatives died. Nevertheless I did everything to get construction going this year. My own parents do not want me to come back. It was my brother who stepped on the mine in Guidel. Therefore my parents are afraid to come. But I said that I cannot stay in Ziguinchor, I was born here.

(Sané, Sukuta)

Interviews have also pointed to the presence of displaced groups in a situation of protracted displacement on the axis Ziguinchor-Goudomp in semi-urban areas. Such groups may consider local integration a viable option to end their displacement. In an urban environment like Ziguinchor, the tutorial *adjati* system found in Diola society whereby the usufruct of land is granted by the elders (acting as hosts or *adjati*) of the groups indigenous to that area to the newcomers<sup>79</sup> – has taken on a politicised nature. Politicians need to secure support from as wide a network as possible and in the case of Casamance support from Dakar becomes essential. At the same time the traditional tutorial system functions on a very small circle of people and it is only when the demands of that circle are satisfied that access to land can be given to ‘outsiders’ – in the context of Casamance mostly the ‘Northerners’. Access to land by displaced groups in an effort to pursue local integration therefore gets caught between these

79 The *adjati*-system ( *adjuati* [Diola-Fogny]) is part of the firstcomer-latecomer system that is typical for the Upper Guinea Coast (cf. Mouser, B.L., 1975. Landlords-Strangers: A Process of Accommodation and Assimilation. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 8(3), pp.425–440). In Mande areas (Sedhiou region) the hosts is called *diatio* [Mande]/ and in Peul areas (Kolda area) *ndiatigui* [Peul].

conflictual dynamics.<sup>80</sup> Such dynamics also have an impact on access to shelter by displaced groups and their possibility to obtain permanent housing opportunities.

As is common in many African countries, customary tenure systems are still prevalent over statutory ones in regulating access to land. The holding of 'petits papiers' by individuals or families gives a false sense of tenure security. In a context of displacement where customary systems holding not only the knowledge of land allocation patterns and location of newcomers but also powers over land dispute resolutions have a high likelihood of being weakened by the very same nature of the flight, land disputes constitute a power obstacle to return and a source of further displacement. It is important to analyse the mechanisms for land dispute resolution available, their operational reach and the ability of displaced groups to access them. Ongoing security concerns have also led to changes in the layout of some villages from their original form to a more compact cluster of houses forcing some flexibility in land tenure mechanisms.

In rural areas, besides the interests of MFDC members, the Senegalese army, traffickers and civilians who remained that regulate access to land, the impact of salinisation processes and the shortening of the agricultural season have also had an impact on the possibilities of return. The presence of mines is a major obstacle to the effective use of the land and demining programmes would need to take into account not only the area of the village and the main access roads but also the land surrounding the village that constitute the main source of income for villagers.

## **5.2. Restoration and rebuilding issues**

### **Temporary employment or reemployment during/after displacement**

Livelihoods are inherently linked to agricultural activities in Casamance. However, restrictions to access to the land, because of conflicts over land, economic interests of different stakeholders and/or mines restrict the availability of cultivable land alongside salinisation processes. Lack of infrastructure that would facilitate trading opportunities also limits livelihood opportunities in rural areas and have thus an impact on the sustainability of return movements as well as local integration and other settlement options. At the same time, interviews have hinted that the labor market in urban areas such as Ziguinchor cannot absorb and provide sustainable livelihoods for city residents including the displaced.

### **Restoration of educational opportunities and access to education**

The lack or limited availability of livelihood opportunities is compounded by the loss and/or lack of educational opportunities. The conflict has not only destroyed school infrastructure but through insecurity and displacement has also had an impact on the availability of teachers and school attendance. For refugees in the Gambia, it is not easy to switch to a different curriculum in a different language. Schools that were established along the border and ran by local staff were successful but destroyed again in 2006. Auxiliary teachers were attracted with

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<sup>80</sup> For a more detailed description of urban tenure systems, cf. Hesselting, Gerti, and John Eichelsheim. 2009. 'Tenure Security in the Periphery of Ziguinchor: The Impact of Politics and Social Relations'. In *Legalising Land Rights*, edited by Janine Ubink, 271. Leiden. 2009.

the prospect to be offered a permanent job by the Senegalese state afterwards. Education seems to be an issue that unites all conflict parties ideally. A participative approach could promote inter-group dialogue in the insecure zones.

#### **Rebuilding of networks and community**

As also highlighted in a parallel study on gender and conflict in Casamance, refugees, returnees, IDPs and host-households share specific vulnerabilities.<sup>81</sup> Vulnerabilities are heightened by the loss or fracturing of existing social networks. Different forms of social capital have been strengthened or weakened depending on the groups and thus leading to forms of exclusion compounded by changes in domestic and broader social dynamics. Communities with stronger ties are better able to support displaced groups in their achievement of durable solutions. Synergy effects with the IDA project are given and cooperation with other organisations addressing vulnerabilities are necessary to tackle these issues.

### **6. Conclusions and recommendations**

Our field research has confirmed that historical policies, inequality, marginalization, weak governance, and entrenched poverty have conspired to foster continued impoverishment and arrested development in displacement-affected communities. This observation is in line with Evans (2003), who argues that deepening poverty has contributed to part of the civilian population being co-opted into the war economy without the use of violence.<sup>82</sup>

The Senegalese State, under president Wade, has ignored the Casamance crises. After the peace by “décret” by President Wade in 2004, most international and national actors have refrained from damaging their reputation by delivering further reconciliation recipes. The attempt to resolve the conflict militarily in 2006 on the Guinea-Bissau border has led only to a fiercer deadlock. That means that centrally ordered – political as militaristic – solutions have failed. President Macky Sall has shown his commitment to resolve the conflict diplomatically and in cooperation with international partners. This is a development that makes a combined economic-humanitarian approach for development feasible.

Obstacles nevertheless remain virulent. The biggest problem could be posed by the political system in Senegal. Senegalese politics is very centralised, hierarchized; politics is interwoven with religion and various local elites have a considerable influence on national politics. Casamance – as demonstrated above – does not have similar local elites that bring forward specific regional interests. Throughout the region, decisions traditionally are reached through a consensus, a consensus that cannot be installed by order. There is no hierarchy in place to guarantee adhesion to politically legitimized decisions. There are on the contrary numerous decentralised decision processes. Those processes have been identified as the basis of the

<sup>81</sup> “Our research identified single mothers and IDPs; furthermore the youth, women with disabilities, and pupils living in insecure areas; and finally refugees and the population living across the borders as especially vulnerable groups” (Rudolf, Markus, 2012, Gender and conflict in the Casamance, p. 51).

<sup>82</sup> Evans, Martin. 2003. ‘Ni Paix Ni Guerre: The Political Economy of Low-level Conflict in the Casamance’. London: Department of Geography; King’s College London.

limited scale of violence that characterizes the Casamance conflict. Those existing processes do show local ownership already, they help to solve a situation that seems gridlocked for external actors. It might be possible to achieve and strengthen local ownership of the peace process in the Casamance for the first time ever.

While acknowledging the approaches adopted by the humanitarian community to gather knowledge and respond to situations of internal displacement,<sup>83</sup> the study consists in the analysis of forced displacement in Casamance from a development perspective. The current assignment has provided an analysis of the specific context of forced displacement in Casamance, of how power and resources are distributed between groups that can be differentiated along fault lines, based on geographical, ethnic, religious, linguistic affiliations and that are also informed by their displacement experience. The field research has highlighted the need to deepen knowledge around displaced populations' decision making and the social and economic opportunity structures in areas of both displacement and return. The recommendations below take into account the scenarios formulated in the previous section to identify actions/activities that would need to be prioritised should a scenario take precedence over the other.

In any case an integrated approach with a combination of measures is needed to resolve the Casamance conflict. After three lost decades such a combination necessarily includes the following successive measures: (i) help rebuilding roads, provide water, sanitation, education, training for and diversification of livelihood activities, transport of goods to ensure market access and access to land (economic, social capital aspect); (ii) support the decentralization of the CRs and the participation of the communities (peace building aspect); (iii) ensure demining, guarantee security, law enforcement (security aspect). Unless specifically stated, recommendations are in support of both refugee and IDP groups as they address similar concerns.

### **Knowledge gap**

There have been limited profiling and needs assessment efforts to date of displaced groups, including the social and economic development requirements of DPs and related productive asset driven opportunities within communities where they are integrating, resettling, or returning. A comprehensive survey, measuring and examining the key factors in determining behaviour vis-à-vis durable solutions also in areas close to the border with The Gambia would be highly beneficial to inform future policies. Data from the 2012 general census in Senegal could already provide a better understanding of patterns of displacement through updated demographic information. Specific information about IDPs – including their living standards and other livelihood and economic variables that can help influence behaviour with regard to durable solutions – could be obtained by partnering with the World Food Programme for their next food security and nutrition survey in Casamance. A number of surveys have recently been implemented, including a Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis, but they do not provide particular insights as to displaced populations.

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83 Ref. Protection Cluster Working Group & Early Recovery Cluster Working Group, 2008, Protection of Conflict-Induced IDPs: Assessment for Action.

### **Land tenure and property rights**

Land rights are at heart of the conflict and of the displacement situation. They inform the decision making of displaced groups vis-a-vis durable solutions and broader political and peace-making processes. A complete analysis clarifying ownership and user rights – including displaced groups – and a mapping of land disputes is not currently available and would be extremely useful in determining the operational scope and availability of current dispute resolution mechanisms. Considering the presence of displaced groups in protracted displacement in semi-urban areas on the axis Ziguinchor-Goudomp particular attention could be given to existing tenure arrangements in that area. Demining activities with a particular attention being given to fertile land around the villages that provide an essential source of income should be prioritised.

Information and legal aid centres targeting specifically displaced groups have proven helpful in other contexts in supporting the choice of displaced groups with regard to durable solutions and in assisting DPs in accessing land by supporting the resolution of land disputes. The role currently played by the Maison de Justice in Ziguinchor could be strengthened by training their staff on the specific situation and rights of IDPs and returning refugees so to play the role of an information and legal aid centre. Should the best-case scenario happen, it is likely that return movements will increase in a short amount of time. Information will be needed as to accessibility of areas of return (both in terms of mine presence and existing basic services and education opportunities) and an increase in land disputes is also to be foreseen. In the case of refugees, solutions could be identified together with UNHCR.

### **Livelihood opportunities in urban areas and education**

Labor market research in Ziguinchor would help identify specific opportunities in the city and help redirect efforts at vocational training in the right direction. General mobility should also be supported with particular attention given to the role of remittances in supporting communities affected by displacement and displaced groups themselves. A sub-regional approach would be highly beneficial.

Both formal and vocational training should be supported. Specific activities can be explored with UNICEF and local authorities in an effort to both attract teachers back in areas that have proved to be insecure in recent times and to provide an updated curriculum for children that have missed on school because of their displacement. General support to livelihoods will also have a secondary effect to encourage re-attendance of children in school where that is already available. In particular: 1. for longer-term refugees, a review mechanism would be necessary for the recognition of qualifications gained abroad; 2. for short-term displaced groups, *classes passerelles* with curricula following the Senegalese standards could be devised to allow children to reintegrate their schools of origin more easily and to appease parents' fears to some extent.

### **Social capital**

The process of displacement has entailed a loss of social capital that can be instrumental in supporting the dynamics needed for an effective peace-building process and the achievement

of durable solutions. Initiatives to build community resilience and capacity of organizations through open participation, and by increased responsibilities to committees representing the displaced should be developed and supported. It is important to note, however, that social capital is part of broader socio-economic power relations, and efforts to restore the power of displaced groups could have negative effects if they support existing hierarchies. Providing direct livelihood support through community-based development programmes in communities that are and have been under stress, for example, may have the undesired effect of being more divisive than cohesive. A measurement of the enabling conditions of peace (“barometer for peace” that could be elaborated together with USAID) would prevent such effects and make it possible to monitor project effects on conflict dynamics more closely.<sup>84</sup> Such an analysis could specify the conditions for an integrative peace-building and development process. It would demonstrate how a participative political approach is necessary that enables the local population in the Casamance to express their opinion through participative political instruments such as a referendum (on the status of the Casamance in Senegal).

#### **Monitoring and evaluation systems**

The rebellion has been appropriated over time by a number of different actors (local, national and regional) that have contributed to sustaining a ‘war economy’ that has generally taken up pre-existing forms of production and trade instead of creating a parallel one. In this context, as expressed by Evans (2003), “agencies have to tread a fine line between not getting embroiled in local politics, while also dealing with political structures that have a legitimate role in achieving peace, reconstruction and development”.<sup>85</sup> In support of its programmes, UNICEF is planning to implement a monitoring system whereby 53 villages in the Kolda region will be monitored every six months at the household level in order to assess the impact of project components. This “micro-census” will include data on education, excision, domestic violence, and other dimensions.<sup>86</sup> There is an opportunity to integrate specific indicators related to durable solutions in such a monitoring mechanism to ensure that the implementation of programmes supporting the choices of displaced groups effectively reaches the desired outcomes.

#### **Local ownership**

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84 USAID has good experiences with a similar monitoring systems applied in Sudan, cf. MSIS, 2010, *Enabling Conditions Barometer for Peace in the Three Transitional Areas of Sudan*. Dilling, Kordofan, Sudan: Draft Report.

85 Evans, Martin, 2003, *Ni paix ni guerre: the political economy of low-level conflict in the Casamance*, p.51

86 In particular, UNICEF’s facility-based assessment study or FBA (cf. UNICEF, 2012) helps monitor and evaluate projects on a local and decentralized level as it:

- Measures the functional capacity and quality of services offered (Prestations de Services - PPS) in the domains health and children;
- Evaluates the frequency of activities or the PPS in their zone of operation;
- Analyses evolution of competences, attitudes and practice of services by measuring the strategic indicators;
- Evaluates of indicators during the period of the program;
- Defines in collaboration with the stakeholder the primary needs for urgent action (for social service at the base, reinforcement and reorientation of activities).

We have argued that any project addressing the issue of displacement should integrate refugees, IDPs, and hosts together into target group. This can be achieved by working together with the displaced communities. Steps that will enable the displaced communities to lead a better life can be designed with their own participation. This study has shown that the local population responds to the conflict situation with high individual flexibility, an increased mobility, and a diversification of livelihoods. The flexible reaction shown by the population has to be acknowledged for further action. Resettlement, return, or local integration should be equally acceptable options for individuals to be supported in future programs. Secure homesteads, access to farm land and employment, redevelopment of infrastructure, and other measures recommended can be aligned and reinforce existing middle range solutions to secure participation, enhance local ownership and develop locally adapted projects. Any development project in the Casamance will, however, remain futile if the conflict, its causes and consequences are not explicitly addressed. An integrated approach is necessary to resolve the Casamance conflict after three lost decades of this low intensity war.

## Appendix

### I. Key research questions

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What are the underlying structural causes of forced migration in the Casamance region; what are the socio-economic incentives for keeping the status quo; what groups benefit/lose from an end of the displacement situation?</li><li>• What is the nature and scale of forced displacement in the region: How many IDPs are there, and who are they, what are the main challenges they face and their capacities (economic, social and human capital); How many refugees (registered and unregistered), who are they, where are they, what are their challenges and capacities?</li><li>• Is there a need to enhance demographic information to plan for durable solutions?</li><li>• What role are host populations playing in displacement or in support of durable solutions?</li><li>• Who are the national/local actors and what is their role?</li><li>• Who are the international (multilateral, bilateral, NGO) actors and what is their role?</li><li>• What are the interests of all the stakeholders, and how do the existing formal and informal institutions, policies, and processes enable them to pursue these interests?</li></ul> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What are the formal and informal institutions and processes that influence the scale and duration of displacement?</li><li>• What are the displaced groups' preferred options and what do they depend on?</li><li>• What are the main factors/policies that influence IDPs/refugees in choosing a specific option?</li><li>• What are the factors/policies influencing them?</li></ul>   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• How do IDPs participate in the planning and management of durable solutions?</li><li>• What factors/policies define IDPs' access to economic (land/jobs/common property/education), social welfare (shelter/food/healthcare/education) and socio-cultural (social inclusion/social networks) resources in displacement? What are the differences between rural and urban IDPs and how do they compare to non-displaced groups?</li><li>• What are the obstacles to address to facilitate achievement of durable solutions to what extent are these linked to and influenced by specific stakeholder interests? What are the consequences of the current prospects for durable solutions on the different stakeholders?</li></ul>   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What programs have integrated considerations on forcibly displaced groups in their planning and implementation?</li><li>• What are the opportunities and constraints regarding development activities to secure sustainable solutions for the displaced?</li><li>• What are the gaps (both conceptual and geographic)? What project activities/financing can fill those gaps?</li></ul>  |



## II. Security situation in detail

### Zones of large-scale military operations and combats.

Area: CR Sindian, CR Oulampane, CR Bounkiling (région Sédhiou)

Dimension	Characteristics	IDPs
<b>Political</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Three factions: Paul/Salif/Lamarana</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>animosities amongst them =&gt;mediation difficult</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Shifting alliances or conflicts between MFDC factions create highly volatile situation</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>protracted insecurity</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>repeated displacement</i></li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>infrastructure damaged</i></li> <li>○ <i>strong commercial link to the Gambia</i></li> <li>○ <i>Civilians engage in transborder traffic</i></li> <li>○ <i>smuggling</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Great risk to loose complete livelihood and livestock</i></li> <li>○ <i>nutrition problems</i></li> <li>○ <i>unemployment</i></li> <li>○ <i>young men at risk to engage in illicit activities strong orientation to the Gambia (transport, marketplace, education, credit)</i></li> <li>○ <i>Cannabis production and trade</i></li> <li>○ <i>timber smuggling</i></li> </ul>
<b>Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Mines present</i></li> <li>○ <i>new areas are mined</i></li> <li>○ <i>combat between MFDC and military</i></li> <li>○ <i>potential combats between MFDC factions</i></li> <li>○ <i>raids of villages</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>positioned between army, and MFDC camps</i></li> <li><i>Few functioning schools</i></li> <li>○ <i>teachers refuse to work in the area</i></li> <li>○ <i>cut-off from Senegal</i></li> <li>○ <i>no service of administration</i></li> <li>○ <i>PCR does not visit villages</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>state of infrastructure unknown to authorities</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>no direct emergency aid to villages</i></li> </ul>
<b>Socio-culture</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Diola population, Muslim clerics involved in mediation</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Strong links to the Gambian Fogny region</i></li> <li>○ <i>durable cohabitation arrangement with Front Nord</i></li> <li>○ <i>accommodation of Salif Sadio's group after 2006</i></li> </ul>

### Zones partially off limits to the military.

Area: CR Sindian, CR Diouloulou, CR Djinaky

Dimension	Characteristics	IDPs
<b>Political</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ MFDC faction Front Nord: Diakaye &amp; Katak camp</li> <li>○ long time co-opted by Senegalese government</li> <li>○ recent mutiny (2009) =&gt; combatants joined Paul's group</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Displacement stopped in 1990s</li> <li>○ arrangement with army created a de facto "liberated zone"               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⇒ quasi-self government of villages</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ local PCR is well accepted mediator between the zone and state structures               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>⇒ stable and safe zone until 2009</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ risk of army attack theoretically given</li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Transborder traffic</li> <li>○ smuggling</li> <li>○ infrastructure damaged</li> <li>○ strong commercial link to the Gambia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ problem of unemployment</li> <li>○ young men at risk to engage in illicit activities</li> <li>○ <b>Combatants and civilians</b> engage in parallel economy               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Cannabis production and sale</li> <li>○ timber trade</li> <li>○ strong orientation to the Gambia (transport, marketplace, education, credit)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Strong presence of contrabands</li> <li>○ no presence of security forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Few government facilities</li> <li>○ lack of administration service</li> </ul>
<b>Socio-culture</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Mande and Diola population</li> <li>○ strong links to the Gambia</li> <li>○ Muslim clerics engage in mediation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Good transborder relations</li> <li>○ durable cohabitation-arrangements with MFDC</li> <li>○ fairly good connection and relations to all fractions of the MFDC</li> </ul>

### Zones of frequent raids, hold-ups, and attacks on individuals.

Area: CR Santhiaba Mandjak, CR Nyassia, CR Niaguis, CR Boutoupa-Camarakounda, CR Adeane, CR Djibanar (région Sédhiou)

Dimension	Characteristics	IDPs
<b>Political</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ MFDC split-up in 2009 (factions: Kassolol/Niantang)</li> <li>○ talks of reunion</li> <li>○ haven for unidentified armed groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Few links between political leaders and MFDC</li> <li>○ complicated transborder relations</li> <li>○ mistrust between G-B and Senegal</li> <li>○ strained relations to security forces</li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Theft of livestock</li> <li>○ land disputes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Abandoned villages</li> <li>○ no access to farm land</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>difficult to access</i></li> <li>○ <i>difficulty to transport goods</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>difficult to restart plantations</i></li> <li>○ <i>great risk to loose livestock</i></li> <li>○ <i>few employment alternatives</i></li> <li>○ <i>unemployment</i></li> <li>○ <i>nutrition problems</i></li> </ul>
<b>Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Mined area</i></li> <li>○ <i>frequent raids</i></li> <li>○ <i>hold-ups</i></li> <li>○ <i>threats towards the population to come back</i></li> <li>○ <i>international bandits operate in the area</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Traumata</i></li> <li>○ <i>fear to go back</i></li> <li>○ <i>cautious return (seasonal, part-time)</i></li> <li>○ <i>mobile livelihoods</i></li> <li>○ <i>multinational alternatives in regard to housing, living, working (split up families)</i></li> </ul>
<b>Socio-culture</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Ethnic and religiously diverse</i></li> <li>○ <i>good links to Guinea-Bissau</i></li> <li>○ <i>many newly arrived communities</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Some villages have not established any arrangement with the MFDC</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>arbitrary assaults</i></li> <li>○ <i>other villages have been divided by the conflict</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>mistrust, denunciations, exile</i></li> </ul>

#### Zones of sporadic violent incidents

All other communities of the Ziguinchor region are exposed to sporadic violence.

<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>IDPs</b>
<b>Political</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Market of peace</i></li> <li>○ <i>multitude of actors</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>No IDP lobby</i></li> <li>○ <i>blocked mediation</i></li> <li>○ <i>victimisation</i></li> <li>○ <i>problem of displacement is not a priority of Senegalese government</i></li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Isolation</i></li> <li>○ <i>transport problem</i></li> <li>○ <i>lack of infrastructure</i></li> <li>○ <i>bad climate for investment small industry</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Problem of transporting and selling agricultures products</i></li> <li>○ <i>theft of harvest</i></li> <li>○ <i>loss of a part of agriculture and livestock</i></li> <li>○ <i>unemployment</i></li> <li>○ <i>nutrition problems</i></li> </ul>
<b>Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Hold-ups on roads</i></li> <li>○ <i>attacks on military camps, outskirts of Bignona and Ziguinchor</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>Traumata and fear to go back</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>cautious return (seasonal, daily pendulum)</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>mobile livelihoods</i></li> <li>⇒ <i>multinational alternatives in regard to housing, living, working (split up</i></li> </ul>

		<i>families)</i>
<b>Socio-culture</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o <i>Diverse actors</i></li> <li>o <i>north/south divide &lt;=&gt; mistrust and stereotypes</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o <i>Discrimination</i></li> <li>o <i>local elite not integrated sufficiently on national level to advocate Casamançais issues</i></li> </ul>

This categorization is based on a macro analysis of the political economy in the Casamance. From a bottom up perspective, category C has to be further differentiated: the situation of the local population living in insecure areas appears to be similar throughout the region, but crucial differences in the relations between the local population and the MFDC can be observed.

### III. Detailed Future Scenarios

Recognising that durable solutions are informed by a variety of factors that can be shaped differently over time and according to external factors, it may be useful to review a number of scenarios in which displaced groups will more or less likely find themselves. A short overview over the best, worst, and most likely scenarios will be given here: either: A) the tactic of the former Senegalese government to wait and see will continue. As the MFDC does not have sufficient means to sustain itself over a prolonged period of time, this tactic will prove demoralizing. The events observed in 2009 would probably reoccur and arms – either laid down (Front Nord) or silenced (Salif Sadio) – will be used again; or: B) the combatants are offered an honourable integration and alternative livelihoods (that exceed the income generated by violent means). This option has to be accompanied by an amnesty and political recognition for the combatants.

#### A. Best scenario

In the best case, regional power holders reach an agreement. Compliance with the agreement is honoured with certain benefits, which, in turn, are guaranteed by a third international party. These benefits would be immediately stopped/ withdrawn/ frozen in the case of any support for the MFDC on behalf of Senegal's neighbors, or any violation of the terms of agreement on the Senegalese side respectively.

#### Political level

In an ideal scenario such an agreement is built on mutual trust is between Jammeh and Sall. The following political conditions would furthermore be met: (i) good governance is gaining ground in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and the Gambia. This is a process necessarily related to effective transnational cooperation, which in the best case becomes everyday practice. (ii) The peace initiatives furthermore carry on and reach all stakeholders, including the combatants. The stakeholders get together at the table of negotiation and engage in mediation efforts and agree to a DDR process. The various factions of the MFDC – political and military wing somehow reaches an operational level of cooperation. The Senegalese government recognises the decentralised political landscape in the Casamance and constructs a peace based on the fundamentals of local low-level conflict management. The WB peace building project (SPF: Community Peacebuilding Initiatives) would finally manage to synergize peace building initiatives on all levels together with other peace initiatives launched already

## **Security**

In an ideal situation on the security level, an acceptable exit-option is offered for the combatants – both on a political and economic level. This means that the armed wing of the MFDC is resolved, lays down the arms, or is integrated into different security forces (possibly in the Gambia). A real reconciliation process addresses the very grievances that are the basis of the crisis and implements measures to tackle the identified problems with local participation. The process is speeded up by an effective cooperation of the parties involved, a transparent approach and assistance from the local population and accompanied by a continued de-mining continues.

## **Development**

On the development level, decentralisation and a clear program of economic development are implemented and show results on the national macro-level in the best case. This is achieved by providing new infrastructure that dis-enclaves the region. In addition, economic development in the rural sector stops the rural exodus. Education and job training facilities are offered and jobs for qualified personal created.

## **Return/ local integration/ resettlement**

In the best case, partners on the micro-level manage to establish local ownership of the peace process, establish confidence of the population, push de-mining, and allow for the sustainable return of refugees and IDPs or their resettlement in other areas. Where local integration is the preferred solution, community-led initiatives facilitate access of IDPs to livelihood opportunities and necessary services, especially in urban areas. A mix of international pressure and guarantees on a diplomatic, financial and technical level furthermore manages to establish relations of goodwill amongst the Gambia, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. A sustainable peace accord is reached and implemented in consequence that restructures political responsibilities and reinforces genuine nation building. Also reconciliation is achieved. The actors finally acknowledge the role of mystical vows hindering the return of combatants, and foster events in which these vows are turned into blessing for unity of the population.

## **B. Worst scenario**

In the worst case, on the contrary, the international and national mediators cannot reach the hardliners.

## **Political level**

The Senegalese government in consequence returns to its policy of ignoring the conflict officially, combined with an unofficial divide and rule tactic based on corruption. International powers maintain a politic of interferences trying to destabilise the region. Local initiatives are intermingled in the “market of peace” and therefore loose credibility among the population and the combatants. The moderate faction in face of this course of events struggles to keep control of their members, further divisions inside the MFDC occur.

## **Security**

The combatants' readiness to use violence grows in correlation to the weariness they experience caused by the "laisser-pourrir-stratégie" of the state. Similar to the events of 2009 the MFDC grows more radical and is alienated from local population. Equipment for warfare is restocked, the militaristic organization is improved, further recruitments happen. A new risk is the proliferation of a third generation of rebels. Raised during and in the conflict – this generation has lost its links to the villages mostly and is therefore less bound by the traditional mediation mechanisms containing the use of violence up-to-date. This in the worst case, in sum leads to a re-emergence of the conflict, that in this case is less controllable than before. The military moves into the rebels' bases in response. In consequence splattered guerrilla groups carry the conflict into towns. Irregular forces, bandits, terrorist from the West African sub region turn to zones-off-limits inside the Casamance as a safe haven.

### **Development**

The Casamance economy in the worst case of a re-emerging conflict suffers even more. Due to the increased insecurity costs to guarantee security, investors are scared away. The transport of maritime and agriculture products get even more difficult under these conditions: Production rates drop. Exports shrink. Remaining plants are closed down, jobs are lost. Infrastructure drains out. Basic services cannot be offered in large parts of the rural areas causing a major rural exodus. Livelihoods cannot be recovered. More people lose their means of income. In addition, food scarcity increases due to diminished access to agricultural land. Education offers do not meet demand caused by demographic changes. The gap of development to the rest of Senegal – in particular Dakar – widens. The unemployed young men without perspectives in a vicious cycle turn to the maquis as a lifestyle or opt for clandestine migration – causing more insecurity and a shortage of workforce in agriculture (adding to the agricultural problems).

### **Return/ local integration/ resettlement**

Measures to resettle DPs, to rebuilt infrastructures and to re-establish livelihoods in "off-limit-zones" are pushed through in the worst case without being backed by the radical and armed parties of the MFDC. Displaced populations find themselves locked in a situation of protracted displacement and new displacement is also likely. The civil population is more heavily affected by armed clashes than before. This means that more violence, more mines, and more military operations cause more displacement, a process that, in turn, makes any return impossible. On top of this, problems like terrorism and drug trade are carried into the Casamance, the MFDC turns into a conglomerate of mercenaries and bandits. The MFDC combatants reach out with their expertise and practice. The sub-region experiences destabilisation caused by marauding small-scale and highly flexible armed groups.

### **C. Most likely scenario**

The most likely scenario is a mixture of the two scenarios just outlined.

### **Political level**

It is most likely that changes will take time and that regional power holders continue a double game. The question of alternatives to a full independence for the Casamance will be debated

evermore. The fragmentation of the political and armed wing of the MFDC complicates the process of reaching an agreement. The various parties involved in the mediation do split apart and start to follow different agendas – possibly giving contra productive incentives to the MFDC to strengthen own position. The problems causing the crisis are not addressed; no true alternative for the combatants is offered and most of the Casamançais remain excluded from the nation-building efforts. These factors make it more and more difficult for the moderate faction of the MFDC to keep their members in line and to maintain military hierarchical structures intact. Unity crumbles. Further divisions occur. Under the surface of a unified command, a lack of leadership is evident.

### **Security**

The more the MFDC splinters the more the marché de la paix flourishes again. Mediators compete amongst each others, effectively blocking any long-term peace agreement. The low level of violence will continue to plague the region and the reigning insecurity inhibits any significant changes in the economic development. Non-identified armed groups with a criminal motivation, continue to harass the local population. Mines and camps continue to block access to fertile agricultural land. Attacks on the military, government structures, roads, etc. will continue sporadically, more diversified and less calculable.

### **Development**

For development this means that local initiatives stick to their local micro approach. Development measures have to be designed for each community according to differing contexts. The military and the MFDC are integrated into this process insofar as to make bearable livelihoods for the population possible for not-contested-territories. Agricultural products are sold before the harvest for a sub-optimal price to wholesalers. Local commerce rests in the hand of smart outsiders. The population – especially the youth – will worry more and more about economic woes. They cease to expect a solution from politics (nationwide) and engage less in the peace building. Education and job training get more important, but cannot be met by the offer in Ziguinchor. The demographic development remains ahead of projects designed to integrate the youth.

### **Return/ Local integration/ resettlement**

If peace talks do not show concrete results quickly a radical militaristic wing will hold out in the bush. Their intention to give up the struggle will be rather hardened by the worsened perspectives of reaching their goals. This in turn means that large areas of cultivable land remain off-limit due to the presence of mines and combatants. The patterns of part-time return – either daily or seasonally – become institutionalised in this case. Due to the absence of alternatives, illicit trade, smuggling, cultivation of cannabis continue to provide necessary income alternatives. The displaced populations – DPs (among them especially women headed households) – remain vulnerable. Their situation deteriorates due to a lack of alternatives for income opportunities.

#### IV. Refugees in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau total, 2012

Senegalese refugees, type of accommodation: individual accommodation

LOCATION	Urban or rural? (a)	Female					Male					Grand total	Basis (c)		
		0-4	5-11	12-17	18-59	60 and over	Total (d)	0-4	5-11	12-17	18-59			60 and over	Total (d)
Gambia															
Gambia : Dispersed in the country / territory	R	693	991	607	1899	283	4473	731	915	626	1391	235	3898	8371	
Gambia : Dispersed in the country / territory	U	54	69	41	184	10	358	45	67	25	125	51	313	671	
Guinea-Bissau															
Bigene : Point	R	187	390	212	849	85	1723	201	387	224	606	96	1514	3237	R
Blombo : Region	R	2	1	0	3	0	6	0	0	0	0	1	1	7	R
Bissau : Autonomous Sector	U	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	6	0	6	8	R
Canchungo : Point	R	69	118	81	240	32	540	47	138	78	166	23	452	992	R
Jolmece : Point	R	33	33	42	99	7	214	20	47	35	77	8	187	401	R
Sao Domingos : Point	R	172	347	169	837	141	1666	209	379	169	527	105	1389	3055	R
<b>Total</b>		<b>1210</b>	<b>1949</b>	<b>1152</b>	<b>4113</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>8982</b>	<b>1253</b>	<b>1933</b>	<b>1157</b>	<b>2898</b>	<b>519</b>	<b>7760</b>	<b>16742</b>	



## V. Refugees arrived in the Gambia, Biwam region, 2012



### STATISTICS REGISTRATION OPERATION LEVEL2 IN THE GAMBIA (Biwam and Kambia) OCTOBER 2012

#### Nationality: Senegalese

##### Age Group by Sex

Age Group	Female	Male	Total	%
0-4	10	10	20	0.02
5-9	10	10	20	0.02
10-14	10	10	20	0.02
15-19	10	10	20	0.02
20-24	10	10	20	0.02
25-29	10	10	20	0.02
30-34	10	10	20	0.02
35-39	10	10	20	0.02
40-44	10	10	20	0.02
45-49	10	10	20	0.02
50-54	10	10	20	0.02
55-59	10	10	20	0.02
60-64	10	10	20	0.02
65-69	10	10	20	0.02
70-74	10	10	20	0.02
75-79	10	10	20	0.02
80-84	10	10	20	0.02
85-89	10	10	20	0.02
90-94	10	10	20	0.02
95-99	10	10	20	0.02
Total	300	300	600	100.00

##### Marital Status by Sex

Sex	Total	%
Female	300	100.00
Male	300	100.00
Total	600	100.00

##### Family Size

Family Size	%	%
1	0.02	0.02
2	0.02	0.02
3	0.02	0.02
4	0.02	0.02
5	0.02	0.02
6	0.02	0.02
7	0.02	0.02
8	0.02	0.02
9	0.02	0.02
10	0.02	0.02
11	0.02	0.02
12	0.02	0.02
13	0.02	0.02
14	0.02	0.02
15	0.02	0.02
16	0.02	0.02
17	0.02	0.02
18	0.02	0.02
19	0.02	0.02
20	0.02	0.02
21	0.02	0.02
22	0.02	0.02
23	0.02	0.02
24	0.02	0.02
25	0.02	0.02
26	0.02	0.02
27	0.02	0.02
28	0.02	0.02
29	0.02	0.02
30	0.02	0.02
31	0.02	0.02
32	0.02	0.02
33	0.02	0.02
34	0.02	0.02
35	0.02	0.02
36	0.02	0.02
37	0.02	0.02
38	0.02	0.02
39	0.02	0.02
40	0.02	0.02
41	0.02	0.02
42	0.02	0.02
43	0.02	0.02
44	0.02	0.02
45	0.02	0.02
46	0.02	0.02
47	0.02	0.02
48	0.02	0.02
49	0.02	0.02
50	0.02	0.02
51	0.02	0.02
52	0.02	0.02
53	0.02	0.02
54	0.02	0.02
55	0.02	0.02
56	0.02	0.02
57	0.02	0.02
58	0.02	0.02
59	0.02	0.02
60	0.02	0.02
61	0.02	0.02
62	0.02	0.02
63	0.02	0.02
64	0.02	0.02
65	0.02	0.02
66	0.02	0.02
67	0.02	0.02
68	0.02	0.02
69	0.02	0.02
70	0.02	0.02
71	0.02	0.02
72	0.02	0.02
73	0.02	0.02
74	0.02	0.02
75	0.02	0.02
76	0.02	0.02
77	0.02	0.02
78	0.02	0.02
79	0.02	0.02
80	0.02	0.02
81	0.02	0.02
82	0.02	0.02
83	0.02	0.02
84	0.02	0.02
85	0.02	0.02
86	0.02	0.02
87	0.02	0.02
88	0.02	0.02
89	0.02	0.02
90	0.02	0.02
91	0.02	0.02
92	0.02	0.02
93	0.02	0.02
94	0.02	0.02
95	0.02	0.02
96	0.02	0.02
97	0.02	0.02
98	0.02	0.02
99	0.02	0.02
Total	600	100.00

##### Marital Status

Marital Status	Total	%
Never Married	300	100.00
Total	600	100.00

##### Locality of Origin in Senegal

Locality of Origin	Total	%
Senegal	600	100.00
Total	600	100.00

##### Education

Education Level	Total	%
Illiterate	600	100.00
0-4	20	0.02
5-9	20	0.02
10-14	20	0.02
15-19	20	0.02
20-24	20	0.02
25-29	20	0.02
30-34	20	0.02
35-39	20	0.02
40-44	20	0.02
45-49	20	0.02
50-54	20	0.02
55-59	20	0.02
60-64	20	0.02
65-69	20	0.02
70-74	20	0.02
75-79	20	0.02
80-84	20	0.02
85-89	20	0.02
90-94	20	0.02
95-99	20	0.02
Total	600	100.00


##### Specific Needs

Specific Needs	Total	%
None	600	100.00
Food	20	0.02
Shelter	20	0.02
Health	20	0.02
Education	20	0.02
Employment	20	0.02
Other	20	0.02
Total	600	100.00

##### Occupation

Occupation	Total	%
Unemployed	600	100.00
0-4	20	0.02
5-9	20	0.02
10-14	20	0.02
15-19	20	0.02
20-24	20	0.02
25-29	20	0.02
30-34	20	0.02
35-39	20	0.02
40-44	20	0.02
45-49	20	0.02
50-54	20	0.02
55-59	20	0.02
60-64	20	0.02
65-69	20	0.02
70-74	20	0.02
75-79	20	0.02
80-84	20	0.02
85-89	20	0.02
90-94	20	0.02
95-99	20	0.02
Total	600	100.00

## VI. Food situation in the Casamance



Maps provided by WFP.